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TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL
KLEPTOCRACY: CML FORFEITURE IN
AMERICA
Stefan B. Herpel*

A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY. By Leo
nard Levy. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
1996. Pp. xiii, 272. $29.95.
Leonard Levy, the legal historian who has written a number of
highly regarded historical studies on various provisions of the
United States Constitution,1 has added to his impressive oeuvre a
new study of civil and criminal forfeiture.2 A License to Steal brings
together a discussion of English legal history, a review of a number
of Nineteenth Century and late Twentieth Century Supreme Court
forfeiture decisions,3 accounts of actual applications of civil and
criminal forfeiture, and a summary and critique of legislative pro
posals that have been made for reform of the civil forfeiture provi
sions of the federal drug statute. There is more space devoted in
the book to civil than criminal forfeiture because, as Levy explains,
* Lawyer in private practice in Ann Arbor, Michigan. B.A. 1978, J.D. 1982, Michigan.
Mr. Herpel argued on behalf of the petitioner, Tma Bennis, in Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S.
442 {1996).
Ed. I would like to thank Peter Henry, an attorney from Alexandria, Virginia,
for his invaluable research assistance, which included reading briefs in Civil War era cases at
the Supreme Court library in Washington. I would also like to acknowledge Noah Eliezer
Yanich, who read and commented on a portion of a draft of this review, and William Skora,
whose cogent ideas about civil forfeiture have influenced my own thinking on this subject.
-

1.
2.

Among these is his Pulitzer Prize-winning

Origins of the Fifth Amendment (1969).

The distinction between civil and criminal forfeiture is a significant one, and it is of
primary concern to Levy in A License to Steal. Civil forfeiture usually, but not always, pro
ceeds by way of in rem actions directed against the property itself, which is named as a party
defendant. Under many in rem forfeiture statutes, the government need only establish by a
"probable cause" standard of proof that the property being sued is forfeitable. Depending
on the particular statute, property may be forfeitable either because it was used or intended
to be used to facilitate a criminal offense, or because it represents the proceeds of illegal
activity, or property that has been purchased with those proceeds. Criminal forfeiture, by
contrast, is effected through traditional in personam criminal proceedings, in which the usual
criminal procedural protections are observed, and property forfeiture is simply part of the
sentence which may be imposed following a conviction for a specified offense.

3. The book went to press shortly before the Supreme Court's decision in Bennis, 516
U.S. 442 {1996), and does not discuss the innocent-owner issues raised in that case under the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. It
also went to press before the Court's decision in the pair of cases consolidated as United
States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996), which addressed whether successive civil forfeiture and
criminal proceedings based on the same underlying offense violated Double Jeopardy. Levy
does, however, discuss one of the two appellate decisions (a decision from the Ninth Circuit)
that was ultimately reversed in Ursery. Pp. 189-90.
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criminal forfeiture was not widely used through most of the coun
try's history.4 Levy discusses criminal forfeiture primarily to con
trast it with civil forfeiture, which affords virtually none of the
procedural protections that are taken for granted in criminal prose
cutions. What emerges clearly and forcefully in this book is that
civil in rem forfeiture proceedings have been used - and increas
ingly are being used5 - as an expedient to circumvent the usual
protections accorded to defendants in criminal proceedings, and to
augment federal, state, and local treasuries. Drawn primarily from
secondary sources, A License to Steal is footnoted throughout and
contains an excellent bibliography.
There is much of value in A License to Steal. The book provides
a concise and entertaining summary of the historical origins of mod
em civil and criminal forfeiture in early English law. Levy's discus
sion of the old English law of "deodands" (pp. 7- 20), under which
inanimate objects which accidentally caused the death of another
human being were forfeited to the Crown, is informative and
thought-provoking, and he provides a fascinating digression on the
trial and execution of animals, a practice which began in medieval
times and continues to this day in some jurisdictions (p. 11). He
also summarizes the operation of the complex of statutes known as
the English Navigation and Trade Acts, which were enacted in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (pp. 39-46). Levy con
cludes, as others have,6 that the deodand never truly became a part
of the American COII1IllOn law (p. 14), and that the development of
civil forfeiture here after Independence owes far more to the tradi
tion of in rem forfeiture proceedings in English and Colonial admi
ralty courts (p. 39).
A License to Steal includes a number of contemporary accounts
of civil forfeiture abuse,7 some drawn from reported cases and
4. The discussion of contemporary criminal forfeiture in A License to Steal focuses pri
marily on two relatively recent revivals of criminal forfeiture that were enacted at the federal
level, in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and in The Con
tinuing Criminal Enterprise Act (CCE).
5. Citing to a 1992 study, Levy points out that in 1992, at the federal level alone, there
were more than 150 forfeiture statutes in existence. P. 47.
6. See James R. Maxeiner, Bane of American Forfeiture Law - Banished at Last?, 62
CORNELL L. REv. 768, 772 (1977); Michael Schechter, Fear and Loathing and the Forfeiture
Laws, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1151, 1154 (1990); see also Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974) ("Deodands did not become part of the common-law
tradition of this country."). Although the deodand did not become part of our common law,
that has not deterred the Supreme Court from invoking the "guilty property" fiction as a
basis for declining to extend to civil forfeiture various constitutional protections. Pp. 61, 84;
see infra note 95.

7. Pp. 1-6; 118-43; 168-69. For a discussion of actual cases of forfeiture abuse that pro
vides a useful complement to Levy's accounts, see generally HENRY J. HYDE, FORFEITING
OuR PROPERTY Rimrrs (1995).
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others from media reports or official investigations into abuse.8
Levy makes clear that the abuses described in these compelling ac
counts - including the forfeiture of property of completely blame
less persons - are attributable to the one-sided powers accorded to
government in effecting forfeitures. These include the right of au
thorities to seize, without prior notice or a hearing, cash or personal
property simply on the basis that there is "probable cause" to be
lieve it is forfeitable,9 and the placement of the burden of proving
that the property is not forfeitable on the property owner in the
ensuing forfeiture proceeding.to
While A License to Steal provides important historical informa
tion, and does much to expose the use of civil forfeiture as a tool of
tyranny, the book suffers somewhat from the uneven quality of its
writing and from errors in the analysis of certain cases and statutes.
In general, the writing ....:..__ or perhaps the editing - does not seem
to be up to the usual high standard of Levy's prior books. There
8. In one especially notorious case recounted by Levy that was the subject of a Pulitzer
Prize-winning series of investigative reports in the Orlando Sentinel, sheriff's deputies in Vo
lusia County, Florida (which encompasses Daytona Beach) routinely stopped drivers on In
terstate 95, most of them African Americans, on the thinnest of pretexts and seized whatever
cash they were carrying on "suspicion" that it was "tainted" money. In the ovenvhelming
majority of cases, no criminal charges were ever brought against the affected drivers, and
their only recourse under Florida law was to hire an attorney and to either prove that the
cash that had been taken from them was not "tainted" or to try to effectuate a settlement for
return of some of it. Millions of dollars were seized in this fashion over a several-year period.
Pp.134-37; Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Tainted Cash or Easy Money? Volusia Deputies Have
Seized $8 Million from I-95 Motorists, ORLAND O SENTINEL, June 14, 1992, at Al. This and a
similar abuse in Louisiana were the subject of a documentary that included video footage of
some of the seizures taken by cameras mounted on police vehicles.See Investigative Reports
(A & E television broadcast, Aug. 1995) (videotape on file with author); see also Reprint of
selected articles from Orlando Sentinel series (available from Orlando Sentinel offices in Or
lando, Fla.).
9. The ex parte seizure of cash or cars, prior to obtaining a judgment in a forfeiture pro
ceeding, gives the government considerable leverage to extort cash settlements in exchange
for either not bringing or dismissing the forfeiture proceeding. Recently, the Supreme Court
has curbed that abuse somewhat by holding that, at least in the case of real property, due
process precludes the ex parte seizure of property during the pendency of an in rem forfeiture
proceeding against it. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43
(1993). See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
10. Under many forfeiture statutes, the owner must prove, usually by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the acts giving rise to the forfeiture did not occur. See, e.g., United States
v. Two Parcels of Property Located at 19 and 25 Castle Street, 31 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
If such acts were committed by somebody other than the owner, some forfeiture statutes
authorize forfeiture regardless of whether the owner knew of or consented to the misuse of
his or her property. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) (addressing constitu
tionality of forfeiture under Michigan statute that had been construed by state courts to per
mit forfeitures without regard to owner's knowledge). Other civil forfeiture statutes afford
innocent-owner defenses, but even then the burden of proving lack of complicity in the
wrongful use of one's property by another is placed on the owner. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(4)(C) (Supp. 1997) (providing that "no conveyance shall be forfeited ...to the
extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner
to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent or willful blindness of
the owner").
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are some awkward constructions,11 and the writing too often lacks
the precision,12 clarity,13 and economy that one would expect in a
book of this kind.
There are also mistakes in Levy's explanations of the operation
of particular forfeiture statutes, and of the holdings in several re
cent Supreme Court forfeiture decisions. For example, in discuss
ing the criminal forfeiture provisions of the federal drug law,14 Levy
asserts that "the judgment of forfeiture in a criminal case is based
on a jury's determination that the defendant is guilty and that be
yond all reasonable doubt the property was somehow involved in
the crime" (p. 170). In fact, correctly or not, the courts that have
addressed this issue have construed the statute to require that, con
sistent \vith traditional rules for factfinding at the sentencing stage,
the relationship between the property and the crime need only be
established by a mere preponderance of the evidence.15
Levy also incorrectly describes the effect of the position the gov
ernment took in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop
erty.16 Levy asserts that "[r]ecognition of the government's
11. See, e.g., p. 89 ("Decisions in forfeiture cases are by no means against the property
owner if the government has proceeded against him criminally."); p. 105 ("Civil forfeiture
cases start with forfeiture because the relation-back doctrine gives the government title to the
property at the moment it was used for criminal purposes
if a court subsequently
agrees.").
-

12. For example, Levy sometimes states legal doctrines in categorical terms, only later to
elaborate significant qualifications to those doctrines. He asserts, for instance, that, in civil
forfeiture, "the guilt or the innocence . . . is simply an extraneous matter of no legal concern,"
p. 22, and that "in civil forfeiture, the owner's guilt or innocence is irrelevant," p. 138. While
this is true of many civil forfeiture statutes, other statutes do provide such defenses, and,
indeed, such defenses are the subject of a rather extensive discussion in a later chapter of his
book. Pp. 161-76. Another example is to be found in the preface. There, elaborating on the
situations in which property implicated in a crime may be forfeited, he states that "[t]he
property may be used to commit the crime, be its product, or be obtained with its fruits." P.
ix. He then adds that, whether civil or criminal, "the forfeiture has a punishing effect." P. x.'
But later in the book, Levy suggests, almost in passing, that "[t]he forfeiture of narcotics
proceeds does not have to be seen as criminal punishment; it is, rather, merely depriving a
narcotics felon of assets that were never rightly his." P. 189.
13. For example, in an otherwise generally accurate discussion of United States v. 92
Buena Vista Avenue, Rumson, New Jersey, 507 U.S. 111 (1993), Levy, after describing the
holding in the case, adds this observation: "In effect, the Court did what Congress should
have done: amend the 1984 act dealing with real property to include the innocent owner's
defense." P. 174. The forfeiture provision at issue in 92 Buena Vzsta Avenue was not, how
ever, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), the provision that authorizes the forfeiture of real property used
or intended to be used to facilitate the commission of a drug offense. Instead, it was 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), a provision added in 1978 that authorized, inter alia, the forfeiture of "all
proceeds traceable" to an illegal drug transaction. And since both provisions were enacted
with innocent-owner defenses, it is difficult to assess what Levy was thinking of when he
made this remark.
14. 18 u.s.c. § 853 (1988).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Tanner, 61 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bieri,
21 F.3d 819 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Elgersma, 971 F.2d 690 (11th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560 (9th Cir. 1989).
16. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
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argument would have meant that innocent owners would be unable
to show that a violation involving their property had occurred with
out their knowledge or consent" (p. 192). In fact, the Court's adop
tion of the government's argument would not have precluded the
assertion of the innocent owner defense altogether; rather, it simply
would have restricted the purposes for which the defense could be
offered. The government in James Daniel Good Real Property
sought the power to seize ex parte a home prior to obtaining a judg
ment in an in rem forfeiture hearing, and to begin collecting the
rents being paid by the owner's tenant. Nothing in the govern
ment's position would, as a legal matter, have precluded the owner
from asserting his innocence as a defense to the forfeiture action.
The owner would instead have been precluded from making that
argument (or any other) to contest the right of the government to
seize control of the home before entry of judgment.17
I.

A PROPOSAL FOR A PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS-BASED

PROHIBITION AGAINST THE USE OF CIVIL FORFEITURE OUTSIDE
!Ts TRADITIONAL APPLICATIONS IN REVENUE, MARITIME, AND
WAR POWER CAS ES
Perhaps because Levy's approach in A License to Steal is pri
marily historical rather than analytical, his book does not attempt
to develop any broad theory for determining whether a particular
use of civil, as opposed to criminal forfeiture is constitutional. Nor
does he ever acknowledge that the history and rationale of Eight
eenth- and Nineteenth-Century uses of civil forfeiture could be rel
evant to assessing the constitutionality of a contemporary civil
forfeiture statute (or its application) that goes far beyond the lim
ited scope of early civil forfeiture. Indeed, since Levy condemns
certain early civil forfeitures with the same passion with which he
condemns other civil forfeitures (pp. 57-58), he may well be unwill
ing to concede the constitutionality of any application of civil forfei
ture, including applications that were utilized in the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth centuries in this country, and in England and her colonies in earlier periods.
·

17. Also referring to the Court's decision in James Daniel Good Real Property, Levy
notes that "[i]n 1993, the Supreme Court, which had had difficulty seeing that civil forfeiture
can constitute punishment as well as a remedy, sensibly decided a Fifth Amendment due
process case." Pp. 190-91. Though the Court's decisions do reveal hopelessly inconsistent
conclusions about the punitive nature of forfeiture, see infra notes 89-95 and accompanying
text, several months prior to the James Daniel Good Real Property decision, the Court had in
fact declared forfeiture under two provisions of the federal drug forfeiture statute to be puni
tive, as Levy himself later acknowledges. P. 202 (discussing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
602 (1993)). And, while James Daniel Good Real Property was an eminently sensible deci
sion, it did not tum on the punitive nature of forfeiture. See infra notes 97-99 and accompa
nying text for a discussion of the holding in James Daniel Good Real Property.
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In Part I of this review, I will therefore attempt to sketch a con
stitutional theory for determining under what circumstances gov
ernments may forfeit property in civil, as opposed to criminal
proceedings. Levy's historical discussion in A License to Steal indi
cates that through much of this country's history, civil forfeiture op
erated, with rare exceptions, within the rather narrow confines of
revenue and admiralty law and the war-making power. Civil forfei
ture was used almost exclusively to redress violations of revenue
and maritime offenses and to provide a legal mechanism for seizing
enemy property in wartime. Most of the significant expansion in
the use and scope of civil forfeiture has occurred in the last two
decades.
Part I of this review will describe those three traditional uses of
forfeiture and their rationales as expressed in judicial opinions. I
will then argue that the long history of these three uses of forfeiture
- together with the special circumstances that justified those uses
- provides a solid foundation for a due process-based limitation
regarding the use of forfeiture. Finally, I will show how the
Supreme Court has largely overlooked the historical limitations on
the scope of civil forfeiture, with the result that its constitutional
analysis of forfeiture has become riddled with contradictions.
Under the most far-reaching due process limitation that the
Court could adopt, the use of civil in rem forfeiture outside its tradi
tional applications in the revenue, maritime, and wartime fields
would simply be prohibited as a general matter. If forfeiture were
to be used as a sanction for the commission of an offense, it would
have to be administered in a criminal proceeding that was con
ducted with the full panoply of procedural protections that apply in
such proceedings.is
Implementation of such a limitation would have profound
ramifications for the law of forfeiture. It would render unconstitu
tional much of the significant extension of civil forfeiture that has
occurred at the state and federal level in the last two decades, and
would greatly restrict further expansion. Furthermore, it would
eliminate many of the doctrinal contradictions that abound in the
Court's constitutional decisions involving civil forfeiture. But the
historical analysis undertaken by Levy will also support less ambi
tious constitutional objectives than the "criminalization" of a signif
icant class of forfeitures. Recognition of the limited scope of and
rationale for the early forms of forfeiture would aid the Court in
fashioning specific due process protections for civil forfeiture pro
ceedings, even if they remained civil in form. While not as far
reaching as the criminalization of forfeiture, the incremental fash18. Like any legal rule, the one I am proposing would not be without exceptions. See

infra note 45 for a discussion of one narrow exception to such a rule.

1916

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1910

ioning of particular due process protections can still go a long way
toward eliminating some of the worst abuses of civil forfeiture.
In Part II of this review, I will propose a specific incremental
change to civil forfeiture that Levy and many others regard as abso
lutely fundamental - namely, the creation of a constitutional pro
tection for innocent owners. I will show how such a protection can
be derived from longstanding substantive due process principles
that were widely accepted by the time the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified in 1868. My essay will trace the development of the
substantive component of due process in judicial opinions and other
extra-judicial sources in the Nineteenth Century. It will conclude
by suggesting that one of the animating principles behind the devel
opment of substantive due process - the belief that private prop
erty should not be arbitrarily taken by the government - remains
very much alive today. That principle, as embodied in the Due Pro
cess Clause, requires the adoption of a protection for innocent own
ers in forfeiture cases.
A.

Traditionally, Civil Forfeiture Has Been Confined to Revenue,
Maritime, and War Power Matters

Before the American Revolution, the English regularly used
civil in rem forfeiture in the Colonies to redress violations of cus
toms and admiralty law. Foremost among these in rem forfeitures
were those administered pursuant to the English Navigation and
Trade Acts.19 Under these Acts, forfeitures of cargo - and, in
some cases, entire ships - could be imposed for violations of a
complex array of customs regulations governing trade between
England and the Colonies.20 By 1700 or shortly thereafter, Colonial
courts - that is, common law courts and the vice-admiralty courts
- were "regularly exercis[ing]"21 jurisdiction to forfeit ships and
19. See CJ. Hendry v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 140 n.4 (1943) (enumerating, for each Col
ony, specific forfeiture cases effected under the English Navigation Acts).
20. As Levy explains, the Navigation and Trade Acts imposed various protectionist trade
measures for England and her Colonies. They provided, for example, that all trade between
England and the Colonies - or between two Colonies - had to be conducted on English
owned vessels in which the master and three-fourths of the crew were citizens of England and
her possessions. Many Colonial commodities could only be exported to other Colonies or to
England, and the only foreign-made goods that were imported into the Colonies were those
that came on English vessels. See pp. 40-41; LAWRENCE A. HARPER, THE ENGLISH NAVIGA·
TION LAWS 387-414 (1964) (describing other features of this comprehensive system of trade
and customs regulations). While the English Navigation Acts constituted perhaps the most
significant statutory basis for in rem forfeitures in the Colonies, the individual Colonies also
effected civil forfeitures under their own customs laws. As the Supreme Court pointed out in
its richly detailed historical discussion in C.J. Hendry v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943), forfei
ture was also used as a sanction for violation of provincial laws "fixing customs duties, regu
lating or prohibiting the exportation or importation of commodities, or requiring a specified
manner of marking, storing or selling" such commodities. 318 U.S. at 145.
21. C.J. Hendry, 318 U.S. at 140.
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cargoes for violation of the Navigation and Trade Acts.22 After
1763, Colonial authorities increasingly used in rem forfeitures to en
force various Acts of Parliament imposing duties on goods shipped
from England, including the Sugar Act and the Townshend Reve
nue Act.23
Failure to comply with provisions of the English Navigation and
Trade Acts, including those establishing customs duties, was not the
only basis for forfeitures of vessels and their cargoes in English ad
miralty and Colonial vice.:.admiralty court proceedings. In rem for
feitures were also authorized in cases involving illegal :fishing24 and
other maritime offenses. In addition, the English admiralty court
and its counterpart in the Colonies exercised jurisdiction over war
time confiscations of vessels and their cargoes, known as "prizes."25
The use of in rem forfeiture as a sanction for violations of customs
and maritime law - and for confiscating the property of citizens of
an enemy during wartime - continued after Independence. As
Levy recounts, the First Congress enacted a statute providing for
the forfeiture of ships and cargoes involved in violations of customs
law, including the failure to pay applicable duties (p. 46). Later
Congresses passed statutes providing for forfeiture of vessels in
cases involving the smuggling of prohibited goods, and piracy (p.
46). During the Civil War, Congress enacted the Confiscation Acts,
which provided for the in rem forfeiture of property that, inter alia,
was owned by citizens of the Confederate States or used to aid the

22. This is not to say that the use of in rem forfeiture proceedings to enforce the Naviga
tion and Trade Acts was popular with the American Colonists. Because of the resistance of
Colonial juries to rendering verdicts for the Crown in those cases, in 1696 Parliament estab
lished juryless courts - the vice-admiralty courts - to exercise that jurisdiction. P. 42; see
also C.J. Hendry, 318 U.S. at 139-43. But that only further aroused the indignation of Ameri
can Colonists, who believed they were being deprived of their ancient right to trial by jury.
See JACK P. GREENE, INTERPRETING EARLY AMERICA: HISTORIOGRAPHICAL EssAYs 323,
397 (1996). The strong objections of American Colonists to the use of juryless, in rem forfei
ture proceedings to enforce the revenue acts passed by Parliament after 1763 are regarded by
a number of historians as being a "cause" of the American revolution. See GREENE, supra, at
323, 397, 399. See generally CARL W. UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY CouRTS AND TiiE
AMERICAN REvoLunON (1960). The same has been said of the notorious writs of assistance,
the general search warrants that permitted Colonial authorities to enter homes, warehouses,
shops, and other places, and to seize goods found there (for the purpose of forfeiture) if they
were suspected of being connected to customs violations. See United States v. 92 Buena
Vista Avenue, 507 U.S. at 118-19 (1993) (suggesting that "the misuse of the hated general
warrant is often cited as an important cause of the American Revolution"). See generally
MAURICE HENRY SMITii, THE WRITS OF AssrSTANCE CASE (1978) (describing historical de
velopment of writs of assistance and providing detailed and colorful account of James Otis's
famous legal challenge to the writ).

23. See GREENE, supra

note 22, at

321-23.

24. See C.J. Hendry, 318 U.S. at 138 n.2 (citing to early English statutes providing for
forfeiture of fishing nets or boats used in unlawful fishing).

25. P. 40; see

also

GREENE,

supra

note 22, at

321.
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Confederate side in the Civil War,26 and the Prize Act, which pro
vided for judicial proceedings to formalize the capture of Confeder
ate prizes.27
The longstanding use of in rem forfeiture rather than civil or
criminal in personam proceedings for violations of customs and
maritime law rests in significant part on a single factor that is com
mon to all three types of forfeitures. That factor is that at least
some of those whose property is subject to forfeiture - and per
haps most of them - are persons or entities over which an Ameri
can court will typically have no personal jurisdiction. When that is
the case, traditional civil or criminal in personam proceedings to
satisfy a claim for restitution or to impose a fine or other penalty
will be unavailing.
With respect to customs regulation, for example, a seller or con
signor of goods is typically a foreign person or entity. Criminal and
civil fines for customs violations generally have no extraterritorial
application and, in any event, a foreign seller who violates such laws
will frequently be outside an American court's jurisdiction.28 If the
seller has committed a customs offense, say by preparing invoices
which understate the purchase price of the goods, forfeiture of the
goods may be the only practical way to exact the equivalent of a
civil or criminal fine from the seller, at least where the seller has
retained title to the goods, as in a consignment sale.29
26. See Act of August 6, 1961, 12 Stat. 319 (providing for forfeiture of property used to
aid the Rebellion); Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 589 (authorizing, inter alia, forfeitures of any
property owned by Rebels), both reprinted in EDWARD McPHERSON, PoLmCAL HISTORY OF
UNITED STATES DURING
GREAT REBELLION 195, 196-98 (2d ed. 1865). The second
of these statutes, as Levy notes, was passed in retaliation against the Sequestration Act
passed by the Confederate Congress in August 1861. P. 51. See infra note 150 and accompa
nying text for a discussion of the Confederate Sequestration Act.

THE

THE

27. Act of June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. 315. While the kinds of confiscations authorized by the
Prize Act had a long history in English and international law, the same may not be true of
confiscations of enemy property found on land within the jurisdiction of the confiscating
government, which is what the Civil War Confiscation Acts authorized. See JAMES G.
RANDALL, THE CoNFJsCATION OF PROPERTY DURING TiiE CIVIL WAR 17 & n.31 (1913).
28.
29.

See United States v. 25 Packages of Panama Hats, 231 U.S. 358, 361 (1913).
See 25 Packages ofPanama Hats, 231 U.S. at 362 (suggesting that, in a case for fraud

ulent undervaluing of merchandise so as to avoid payment of duties, the use of "a proceeding
against the res," rather than a criminal action, is appropriate because of "the very fact that
the criminal provision does not operate extraterritorially against the consignor"); see also
HARPER, supra note 20, at 111 (noting that the use of in rem proceedings in English customs
cases "proved valuable . . . because the authorities could more often lay their hands upon
smuggled merchandise than upon the smugglers"). Of course, in a case in which the foreign
seller has no complicity in a customs law violation perpetrated by the buyer or consignee, or
where a culpable seller has already transferred title to the goods to the buyer upon their
entry into the importing country, then the forfeiture would not truly be functioning as a
substitute for imposition of an in personam criminal or civil fine on the seller. But in many
cases it may not be easy for customs officials to ascertain whether the importer, the foreign
seller, or some other party, owns the goods in question - and which party or parties is
responsible for a violation - especially if the seller is thousands of miles away and not within
the subpoena power of the courts. For that reason, the government could arguably justify the
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Scholars have also pointed to the unavailability of ordinary in
civil and criminal processes for many maritime offenses
in explaining the longstanding use of forfeiture in those cases. The
distinctive feature of maritime activities is that they take place on
the oceans, "where sovereignty either does not exist, or is in dis
pute,"30 and that, "more often than not . . . the owner of a vessel or sometimes even the crew . : . [is] not reachable by the laws of any
nation against which some offence or injury was alleged on the part
of that vessel and its owners. "31 As such, civil in rem forfeiture was
often the only practical method for satisfying claims against foreign
persons or entities arising out of violations of admiralty law.32
A similar argument was also offered to justify the use of in rem
forfeiture in the wartime confiscation cases that arose in connection
with the Revolutionary War,33 the War of 1812,34 and the Civil
War.35 In Miller v. United States,36 the Supreme Court held that in
rem forfeitures of, inter alia, private property owned by inhabitants
of the Confederate states during the Civil War, but situated within
the Union states, were proper exercises of the "war powers" of the
United States, as those powers are recognized in international law
personam

use of the forfeitur e r emedy as a prophylacti c measure. Tr aditi onal notions of sovereignty
could also be invoked to j ustify the use of civil in rem for feitur e in customs cases. See
Buttfi eld v. Stranahan, 192 U .S . 470 , 492- 93 (1903) ("[F]rom the begi nning Congr ess has
ex er cised a plenar y power in r espect to the ex clusion of merchandise brought from foreign
countries; not alone directly by the enactm ent of embar g o statutes, but also indirectly as a
necessar y r esult of pr ovisions contained in tariff legislati on." ).
30 . Jacob J. Fm kelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 16 9, 215
(1973).
31. Fm kelstein, supra note 30 , at 231; see also 4 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 6 0 7, at 177
(6 th ed. 1940 ) ("[I] n a great var iety of . . . cases [involving violati ons of the laws of trade,
navigation, and r evenue committed on navigable waters] , the vessels and the goods alone ar e
within the reach of the pr ocess of the courts; the individuals concerned ar e in other countr ies
and are not amenable to the civil or criminal pr ocesses of our courts." ).
32. In his separ ate dissent in Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U .S . 442 (1996 ), Justice Kennedy
acknowledged this fe ature of admiralty law as pr oviding a j ustifi cation for forfeitures on the
high seas. See Bennis, 516 U.S . at 472 (Kennedy, J . , dissenti ng ) ("Th e forfeitur e of vessels
pursuant to the admiralty and mar iti me law has a long , well-r ecog niz ed traditi on, evolving as
it did from the necessity of fi nding some source of compensati on for inj ur ies done by a vessel
whose r esponsible owner s wer e often . . . beyond the pr acti cal reach of the law and its
pr ocesses." ).
33. See War e v. Hylton, 3 U .S . (3 Dall. ) 199 (1796 ) (upholding S tate of Virgi nia' s power
to appropriate var ious Br itish debts sequestered during the Revoluti on).
34. See Br own v. U nited S tates, 12 U.S. (8 Cr anch) 110 (1814) (fi nding r igh t of fe der al
governm ent to seize Br itish pr operty found on land at the outbr eak of the War of 1812).
35. See, e.g., Miller v. U nited S tates, 78 U .S . (11 Wall. ) 26 8 (1871) (upholding Civil War
Confi scati on Acts in case involving forfeitur e of property in Michigan belongi ng to Virginia
"rebel" ). S ee infra notes 6 7-73 and accompanying tex t for an ex tended discussion of Miller.
36 . 78 U .S. (11 Wall. ) 26 8 (1871).
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and granted by the Constitution.37 If the war power does properly
extend to such confiscations, then the use of an in rem, rather than
an in personam proceeding to effect a property confiscation would
be justified on the grounds that, as a legal or practical matter, courts
in the country undertaking the seizure would have no jurisdiction to
entertain an in personam action over a foreign citizen in an enemy
state.38
The forfeiture remedy was confined almost exclusively to cus
toms, maritime,39 and .war power confiscations through most of the
Nineteenth Century, with two principal exceptions. First, the for
feiture remedy also began to appear in statutes - mostly state li
quor prohibition statutes of the 1840s and 1850s - declaring
certain activities to be nuisances and providing for their abatement
in equitable proceedings, through injunction or property forfeiture
(followed by destruction rather than sale). Such statutes, by using
civil, equitable proceedings to enforce the criminal law,40 effected a
significant expansion of governmental power and raised serious due
process questions.41 To be sure, these statutes typically employed
37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 {"Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o declare War,
grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water.").
38. See RUFUs WAPLF.S, A TREATISE ON PROCEEDINGS IN REM 408 (1882). Professor
Waples conceded that in the case of civil wars, the inability to obtain in personam jurisdiction
over enemies may be practical, rather than legal, but thought that this distinction irrelevant
for purposes of justifying the use of the in rem procedure. See id. at 408.
39. Some of the maritime forfeiture provisions were enacted at the state level, including
provisions which authorized forfeiture of fish nets and vessels illegally used in fishing in state
tidal waters and other navigable waters. See CJ. Hendry v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 149 (1943).
40. At common law, the general rule was that equity could not enjoin the commission of
a crime, except where there was some separate injury to a private interest. See United States
v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 695 {1993).
41. Indeed, most of the provisions in the prohibition statutes authorizing the summary
forfeiture and destruction of liquor were struck down under various state constitutional pro
visions in the 1850s. See RoDNEY L. Morr, DUE PROCESS 314 {1926). These decisions were
a precursor to the famous holding of New York's highest court in Wynehamer v. State of New
York, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856), which applied substantive due process principles to declare uncon
stitutional the state prohibition law. See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. To be
sure, in 1887, the United States Supreme Court upheld, against a due process challenge, a
statute providing for forfeiture of liquor and other property used to maintain the nuisance.
See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 672-73 {1887). In addition to upholding the forfeiture
provisions of the Kansas prohibition law, the Mugler court rejected the claim that the provi
sion of the statute that forbade the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages also violated
due process, insofar as it rendered valueless breweries that had once been lawful to operate.
See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 664. But the soundness of both holdings in Mugler is open to serious
doubt. In support of its ruling that these "equitable" forfeitures did not violate due process,
the Mugler Court relied heavily on a historical analysis that has proved to be incorrect. In an
attempt to show that equitable proceedings of this kind had been used for centuries, the
Court quoted Justice Story's treatise on equity for the proposition that "(i]n regard to public
nuisances, the jurisdiction of courts of equity seems to have been of very ancient date, and
has been distinctly traced back to the reign of Queen Elizabeth." 123 U.S. at 672. In fact,
recent legal scholarship demonstrates that that jurisdiction was not established in England
until the Nineteenth Century. See J.R. Spencer, Public Nuisance: A Critical Examination, 48
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 55, 67-68 (1989); see also Henry Schofield, Equity Jurisdiction to Abate and
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in personam, rather than in rem proceedings,42 and the equitable
principles from which these statutory actions were derived43 had
observed strict rules regarding when destruction of property, as op
posed to a mere prohibitory injunction, would be ordered.44 But as
equitable proceedings, they were conducted without a jury, and the
government's standard of proof was reduced to a preponderance of
the evidence. Moreover, in practice, the statutory provisions re
garding forfeiture were often mandatory in nature.45
The second exception was the use of forfeiture for excise tax
violations. This use resulted from a change in tax policy during the
Civil War years. From the formation of the Republic through the
onset of the Civil War, virtually the only tax imposed by the federal
Enjoin Illegal Saloons as Public Nuisances, 8 ILL. REv. 19, 20-21 {1914). And a recent
Supreme Court case has raised some question as to whether the Court's 1888 holding is still
good law. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.14 (1992)
(stating only that "perhaps" a prohibition statute of the kind at issue in Mugler would pass
constitutional muster); 505 U.S. at 1051 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
Court's opinion in Lucas has "disavow[ed] the holding and reasoning of Mugler''). If the
constitutionality of the provisions of the law in Mugler prohibiting sale and manufacture of
alcoholic beverages is in doubt, then a fortiori the constitutionality of the forfeiture provi
sions of that law are also in doubt. .
42. The in personam nature of these nuisance abatement proceedings was consistent with
the long-standing rule that equity always acts in personam. See G. BISPHAM, THE PruNcIPLES
OF EQUITY § 26, at 33-35 {1931).
43. The public nuisance statutes apparently were a statutory extension of a new develop
ment in the common law during the Nineteenth Century - that of civil courts assuming
jurisdiction to "enjoin[ ] [public] nuisances at the suit of the state." H. McCuNTOCK,
McCuNTOCK ON EQUITY 441 (1948). This jurisdiction, which as of 1888 was "not frequently
exercised," Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 673 {1888), represented a departure from the
English common law as it had existed for many centuries. See Spencer, supra note 41, at 5961, 67-68 {indicating that public nuisances were crimes at early common law and that their
abatement for many centuries was almost exclusively a matter for the criminal courts until
the early Nineteenth Century, when English equity courts first began to issue injunctions to
abate public nuisances in suits brought by the attorney general).
44. While the usual remedy at common law for public nuisance abatement was a prohibi
tory injunction, courts would order destruction of property in extreme cases if that was the
only way to abate a nuisance. See JoHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITABLE
REMEDIES § 534, at 915 {1905); Welch v. Stowell, 2 Doug. 332, 343 (Mich. 1846) {holding that
municipality's destruction of house used for prostitution activities was unlawful because it
exceeded what was "absolutely necessary to abate the nuisance" and failed to "protect . . .
the rights of property, which should be held sacred"). That common law limitation on de
struction of property as a remedy for nuisance abatement has continued to this day. See, e.g.,
City of Minot v. Freelander, 380 N.W.2d 327, 324 (N.D. 1986) ("[D]estruction of property is a
drastic remedy, and it must necessarily be a remedy of last resort . . .").
45. In addition to the power to abate public nuisances, it was generally recognized by the
Nineteenth Century that states also had the power to destroy private property, without pay
ing compensation to the owner, in times of "great public calamity." Morr, supra note 41, at
344. The principal examples of that era were to prevent property from falling into the hands
of the enemy during war, and to prevent conflagrations from spreading through a commu
nity. Id. at 344-45 & nn.43-44; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 & n.16 (recognizing states'
power at common law to abate public nuisances and to "destr[oy] . . . real and personal
property, in cases of actual necessity, . . . to forestall . . . grave threats to the lives and prop
erty of others," without providing compensation to property owner) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
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government - and hence the only revenue measure for which it
utilized the forfeiture sanction - was the tariff.46 When Congress
enacted a comprehensive scheme of excise taxes on domestically
produced goods during the Civil War,47 however, a provision for
forfeiture was included.48
It appears that Congress did not begin using civil forfeiture
outside the admiralty, revenue, and war power fields in any signifi
cant way until the advent of Prohibition in 1920.49 But even during
46. There were a few excise taxes imposed by Congress in 1791 and 1794, and a stamp tax
was imposed on various legal instruments in 1797. But these taxes were met with considera
ble opposition, of which the so-called Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania was a part, and the
entire system was repealed in 1802. The War of 1812 led to the reintroduction of some of
these taxes, but they were abandoned in 1818. See RAYMOND E. MANNING, FEDERAL
EXCISE TAXES 78-79 {1943).
47.

See Internal Revenue Act of July 1,

1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432.

48. Because the rationale for using the forfeiture remedy in customs cases did not seem
to apply to cases involving taxation of internally produced goods, a case could have been
made that employment of in rem forfeitures in the latter context violated due process. But
that argument does not appear to have been pressed by any person whose property was
forfeited for failure to pay excise taxes, at least in any Supreme Court case. The first
Supreme Court case involving a forfeiture based on the use of property in a manner that
defrauded the government of excise taxes was Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S.
395 (1878). The brief for petitioner in Dobbins's Distillery did not make that (or any other
constitutional argument, see Brief of Plaintiff in Error, Dobbins's Distillery v. United States,
96 U.S. 395 {1877) (No. 145), and the Court was perfectly content to rely on admiralty and
customs precedents in affirming the forfeiture of an allegedly innocent owner's property.
See, e.g., 96 U.S. at 400, 401-02, 404 (1877). On the other hand, if such a due process argu
ment had been made, the Court might have countered it by asserting that the collection of
the tax revenues is essential to the functioning of government. Recently, the Supreme Court
has distinguished revenue forfeitures {including those based on failure to pay excise taxes)
from drug forfeitures on precisely the grounds that "[t]he prompt payment of taxes . . . may
be vital to the existence of government." United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,
510 U.S. 43, 60 {1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 621 (1885) (noting that certain internal revenue measures passed during
the Civil War were "adopted at a period of great national excitement, when the powers of
government were subjected to severe strain to protect the national existence"). Indeed, at
about the time Dobbins's Distillery was decided, the federal government was facing some
thing of a crisis in the collection of federal excise taxes on alcohol. After the end of the Civil
War, the illicit distilling of spirits became a common means of defrauding the government out
of the alcohol tax, particularly in the southern states, where opposition to the government
still ran high. See ALBERT s. BOLLES, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1861 TO
1885, at 435-36 {1888). According to Bolles, "In some of the districts where illicit distilling
was extensively practiced, leading citizens were either directly interested in the business, or
were in active sympathy with the distillers . . . . " Id. at 436. In his annual report for 1878, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue reported that "twenty-six officers and employees were
killed, and forty-seven wounded, while engaged in enforcing the internal revenue laws." Id.
at 437 (quoting from Report (internal quotation marks omitted)). He reported that, "as a
rule, no efforts were made on the part of the State officers to arrest the murderers . . . ." Id.
at 438 (quoting from Report (internal quotation marks omitted)).
49. The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified in 1919, and the Vol
stead Act, which implemented national Prohibition, was passed later that year. See 41 Stat.
305 {1919). To be sure, Congress had earlier provided for the seizure and in rem forfeiture of
contaminated and mismarked food in section 10 of the Food and Drug Act of June 30, 1906,
Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, and the states had begun to exercise similar power to seize
adulterated food at approximately the same time. See Morr, supra note 41, at 345-46. But
the seizure and destruction of contaminated food almost surely falls within the State's power
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Prohibition, most liquor-related forfeitures were effected under the
forfeiture provisions of the internal revenue laws, rather than those
contained in the Volstead Act, which were more in the nature of
criminal forfeiture provisions.so With the repeal of Prohibition in
1932, the use of civil forfeiture in criminal law enforcement waned
considerably, at least at the federal level. But civil forfeiture gained
new prominence in the 1980s, when the federal government began
using it aggressively in the enforcement of laws prohibiting or regu
lating the possession or sale of controlled substances.51 Today, as
Levy points out, there are more than 150 federal civil forfeiture
provisions.52 Some of these statutes punish conduct that is specifi
cally made criminal by another statute. Others, while they do not
predicate forfeitures on conduct that is the subject of a separate
criminal statute, nevertheless impose forfeitures for offenses of a
kind that formerly would have been made the subject of a criminal
statute, instead of an in rem forfeiture proceeding. Analogous for
feiture statutes are increasingly appearing at state and local levels.
B.

A Due Process Prohibition Against the Use of Civil Forfeiture
Outside Its Traditional Domains

In this section, I will suggest a due process-based prohibition
against certain uses of civil - as opposed to criminal - forfeiture
that draws on the historical analysis presented in the preceding sec
tion. The due process limitation I am proposing starts from the selfto "destr[oy] real and personal property, in cases of actual necessity . . . to forestall . . . grave
threats to the lives and property of others" Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 & n.16; see supra note 45.
To that extent, it could be defended on due process grounds.
50. Although the Volstead Act provided for the in rem forfeiture of boats or vehicles
used in the unlawful transportation of liquor, the statute required that the person "in charge"
of the boat or vehicle be convicted criminally before a forfeiture could be effected, and it also
contained protections for innocent lienors. See KENNETH M. MURCHISON, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW DoCTRINES: THE FORGOTTEN INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL PROHIBmoN 128
(1994). Because of these protections, law enforcement authorities during Prohibition usually
relied on the forfeiture provisions of the excise tax law, which had their origins in an 1866
statute, as a basis for effecting forfeitures of conveyances in which illicit liquor was found.
See id. at 131. See HowARD L. McBAIN, PRoHiBmoN LEGAL AND ILLEGAL 131 (1928).
That law authorized the forfeiture of conveyances "used in the removal or for the deposit or
concealment" of liquor "with the intent to defraud" the United States of (liquor) taxes, with
out the requirement of a criminal conviction and without regard to the innocence of an
owner or lienor. See id. at 131.
51. Congress included a provision authorizing the forfeiture of conveyances (e.g.,
automobiles, boats, and airplanes) for violations of federal drug law in 1970. See Act of 1970,
ch. 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276-78 (1970) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) (1994)). But
the use of that and related civil forfeiture provisions in drug law enforcement did not begin in
earnest until the 1980s. See CoMPTROLLER GENERAL, AssET FORFEITURE: A SELD OM
USED TOOL IN COMBATTING DRUG TRAFFICKING (1981). The federal asset forfeiture fund
grew from $27 million in 1984 to $531 million in 1995. See U.S. DEPT. OF JusTicE, ASSET
FORFEITURE FACT SHEET (1993).
52. P. 47. See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCH SERv., CRIME
FORFEITURE (1992) (listing various federal forfeiture statutes).
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evident proposition that civil forfeiture serves criminal law objec
tives. As the Supreme Court has said, "[A] forfeiture proceeding is
quasi-criminal in character," and "[i]ts object, like a criminal pro
ceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the
law."53 Seizing a person's property because he or she used it in the
commission of a ·crime, even when that property has many legiti
mate uses, is in this respect the equivalent of a criminal fine,54 albeit
a fine that exhibits a rather arbitrary variability in amount from
case to case.55 As such, civil forfeiture is quite clearly designed to
serve the criminal law objectives of deterrence and retribution.56
Because of the difficulty of obtaining in personam jurisdiction
over perpetrators of certain classes of crime, our legal tradition long
ago accepted the use of in rem forfeiture actions as a sanction for
certain limited classes of violations of law. As discussed at length
above, forfeiture was used to redress violations of maritime and
revenue law, and to facilitate the confiscation of enemy property in
wartime. Civil forfeiture, then, was viewed a narrow exception to
the basic requirement that criminal proceedings (with all of the pro
cedural protections that have come to be associated with such pro
ceedings) be used to enforce the criminal law.
The notion that government may use "civil" proceedings to en
force the full spectrum of criminal law offenses is simply not an
established part of our legal tradition. It is easy to understand why.
For if governments could indiscriminately use civil forfeiture as a
tool for enforcing the criminal law, it would, as Justice Field warned
more than 125 years ago, "work[ ] a complete revolution in our
criminal jurisprudence."57
The use of civil ,in. rem forfeiture proceedings, rather than crimi
nal proceedings, to enforce the criminal law plainly must have some
limits. Could the state, for example, authorize in rem forfeiture
proceedings of homes where there is merely "probable cause" to
believe that the home was used to facilitate a homicide or a larceny,
53. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965).
54. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971) ("From
the relevant constitutional standpoint there is no difference between a man who 'forfeits'
$8,674 because he has used the money [for illegal activities] and a man who pays a 'criminal
fine' of $8,674 as a result of the same course of conduct.").
55. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621 (1993) (noting the "dramatic variations
in the value of conveyances and real property" subject to forfeiture under the federal drug
forfeiture statute).
56. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974) (alluding to
the "punitive and deterrent" purposes served by civil forfeiture); see also Bennis v. Michigan,
516 U.S. 442, 465 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 22,
State ex rel Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483 (Mich. 1994) (No. 97339)
(internal quotation marks omitted)) (mentioning State's own characterization of the forfei
ture in that case as "swift and certain punishment" for an offense).
57. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 323 (1871) (Field, J., dissenting). See
infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Field dissent.
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or of cars where there is "probable cause" to believe that the owner
was driving while impaired?
Justice Kennedy observed recently that the· Court "would not
allow a State to evade its burden of proof by replacing its criminal
law with a civil system in which there is no presumption of inno
cence and the defendant has the burden of proof."58 If that is true,
then surely the Court would not permit government to create a
comprehensive, parallel system of criminal law enforcement that
utilized in rem forfeiture proceedings to punish for criminal of
fenses, even if such a system did not formally "replace" the entire
system of criminal prosecutions, but was merely an adjunct to it.
Giving prosecutors the option of using such a comprehensive
scheme of in rem forfeiture remedies - whether as a supplement to
traditional criminal prosecutions or in place of them (when, for ex
ample, they were unwilling or unable to meet the higher burdens
associated with criminal prosecutions) - would seem to subvert
our entire criminal justice system.59 But this is precisely the general
direction in which state and federal governments seem to be
heading.
We can, I think, all agree as a general matter that the use of
civil, rather than criminal procedures, to administer the criminal
law "offends [a] principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"60 - and,
as such, violates due process. That said, if civil proceedings in some
circumstances have historically been used to enforce the criminal
law, it would be more difficult (though by no means impossible)61
to establish that similar modern uses of those civil proceedings vio
late due process. In the case of civil forfeiture, however, there is no
longstanding tradition for using civil forfeitlire outside the mari
time, revenue, and war power fields. If a modern application of
5 8. Foucha v. Louisi ana, 5 0 4 U .S . 71, 94 {1992) {Kennedy , J., di ssenting ).
5 9. To be sure, in rem forfei tur e can only be used as a law enforcement tool w her e the
wrongdoer' s pr operty is somehow i nvolved in the commissi on of a cri me. But many courts,
i ncl uding the S upr eme Cour t, have r equir ed only the most tenuous rel ati onshi p between
pr oper ty and a cr ime in or der to forfeit i t on that basi s. See, e.g., U nited S tates v. James
Dani el G ood Real Pr oper ty , 5 10 U .S . 43, 82 ( 1993) ( Thomas, J . , concurr ing in par t and dis
senting i n par t) ( stating that under the federal dr ug forfei tur e statute, " l ar g e tr acts of l and
[and any i mpr ovements thereon] w hich have no connecti on w ith crime other than bein g the
location w her e a dr ug transacti on occurred are subj ect to forfei ture" ) (citation and intern al
quotati on marks omitted) {fir st al ter ati on i n origi nal); see also Bennis, 5 16 U .S . at 446 (up
holding forfeitur e of wife' s i nterest in car based on husband' s si ngl e use of car for liai son with
a pr ostitute).
60 . S ny der v. Massachusetts, 291 U .S . 97, 105 ( 1934).
61. See Pacific Mut. Life I ns. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U .S . 1, 18 {1990 ) ( noting, i n the contex t of
a due pr ocess chal lenge, that " nei ther the antiquity of a pr actice nor the fact of steadfa st
legisl ative and j udici al adherence to it through the centuries i nsulates it from constitutional
attack" ) ( quoting Wi lliams v. I l li noi s, 399 U .S . 235 , 239 {1970 ) (intern al quotati on mar ks
omitted)).
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C .

In Its Treatment of Civil Forfeiture, the Supreme Court Has
Largely Overlooked the Constitutional Significance of the
Historically Narrow Scope of Civil Forfeiture

1.

Nineteenth-Century Cases

A
t one time in ou r constitutional histo r
y , it appea sr that the
Sup e
r me Cou r
t would ha v
e accepted the v
iew that ,while the use of
ci v
il fo r
feitu e
r in the administ a
r tion of tax and admi r
alty law was
pe r
fectly constitutional , its use to enfo r
ce othe r penal statutes
would violate due p o
r cess . In 1871,when the Cou r
t decided Miller
v. United States, 62it suggested in dictathat fo fr e
iting p r
ope r
ty in a
ci v
il p o
r ceeding whose pu p
r ose was to "punish o ff
enses "against the
United States would not compo r
t wi
th the Due P r
ocess Clause of
the Fif h
t A
mendment . Millerin v
ol v
ed a constitutional challenge to
the Ci v
il Wa r Con fi
s c
ation A
cts enacte dby the Union Go v
e rnment
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ided o
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e r
ty used ,o rintended to be used to aid ,abet ,o rp o
r mote the Con 
fede r
acy in the Ci v
il Wa r.63 Itcontained no c r
iminal p r
o v
isions .
The 1862 A
ct contained both c r
iminal p o
r v
isions w
( hich p o
r v
ided
fo rthe imposition of fi
nes ,imp r
isonment ,and death ) and ci v
il fo r
feitu e
r p o
r v
isions . A
mong the c r
iminal o ff
enses de fi
ned by the
1862 Act was gi ving "ai dand comfo rt to . . . t[ he] rebellion ."64 The
ci v
il fo fr e
itu e
r p o
r v
isions of the A
ct also autho riz
ed the con fisca 
tion of p o
r pe r
ty of , inter alia, allsuch pe srons .65 The A
ct p r
o v
ided
that the o
f r
feitu e
r p o
r ceedings we e
r to be conducted in rem,unde r
p o
r cedu e
r s simila rto those used in admi a
r lty o r r
e v
enue fo fr e
itu e
r
cases .66
The fo rfeitu e
r in Millerwas di e
r cted against ce r
tain stock in a
Michigan co r
po a
r tion owned by Samuel Mille r,a r
esident of V
i r
gi
nia . The United States alleged in the p r
oceeding against the stock
62. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1871).
63. Act of August 6, 1861, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 319.
64. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, § 2, 12 Stat. 589, 590.

65. See § 5, 12 Stat. at 590.
66. See § 7, 12 Stat. at 591.
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that Miller had fought against the United States in the Civil War
and had aided, countenanced, and abetted the Confederacy in that
war. The petitioner in Miller argued, inter alia, that, inasmuch as
the criminal provisions of the 1862Act punish individuals for the
offense of giving "aid and comfort to . . . [the] rebellion" by fine or
imprisonment, the forfeiture provisions, which are triggered by the
very same conduct, must also be deemed punishment. As such, he
contended, the use of a civil proceeding to administer such a forfei
ture offended several constitutional provisions, including the Due
Process Clause.
Significantly, the Court in Miller acknowledged that if the pur
pose of the forfeiture provisions of the 1861 and 1862Acts was to
"punish offenses against the sovereignty of the United States," then
"there would be force in the objection that Congress has disre
garded the restrictions of the fifth and sixth amendments of the
Constitution."67 The constitutional provisions to which the Court
was referring included the Due Process Clause, and the Grand Jury
Indictment and Jury Trial Clauses of the Sixth Amendment.68 The
Court concluded, however, that the forfeiture provisions of the
1861and 1862Acts were "not enacted under the municipal power
of the Congress to legislate for the punishment of [the crime of
treason]," but were instead a legitimate exercise of "the war powers
of the government."69 For that reason, the Court said, the forfei
ture provisions of the Confiscation Acts were not subject to the
Due Process Clause and other restrictions imposed by the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.70

In dissent, Justice Field, j oined by Justice Clifford, expressly
adopted the principle which the majority had endorsed only in dicta
namely, that the use of civil forfeiture proceedings to punish vio
lations of the criminal law was unconstitutional. Justice Field be
lieved that the Confiscation Acts had made precisely that use of
civil forfeiture, because, in his view, its provisions were not directed
at "enemies" of the United States, but rather at the property of
those guilty of the crime of treason.71 If the government may con
fiscate the property of a traitor through an in rem forfeiture pro
ceeding, Justice Field observed, then logically it would be able to
use such civil proceedings "to confiscate the property of the bur
glar, the highwayman or the murderer . . . . "72 This, he said, would

-

67. Miller, 78 U.S. at 304.
68. See Miller, 78 U.S. at 304.
69. Miller, 78 U.S. at 304-05. The war power, the Miller Court noted, included express
grants in the Constitution to "declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make
rules respecting captures on land and water." 78 U.S. at 305.
70. See Miller, 78 U.S. at 305.
71. Miller, 78 U.S. at 319-21 (Field, J., dissenting).
72. Miller, 78 U.S. at 323 (Field, J., dissenting).
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"
work [ ]a complete revolution in our criminal jurisprudence " b
y
establish [ing] the doctrine that proceedings o
f r the punishment o f
crime against the person o fthe o ff
ender may be disregarded ,and
proceedings o
f r such punishment be taken against his property
alone , or that proceedings may b
e taken at the same time b
oth
against the person and the property ,and thus a dou b
le punishment
o
f r the same o ff
ence be in fil
cted ".73
The Millerdicta held out the promise that the Court would ,at
the very least ,confine civil for fe
iture to its traditional uses in mari 
time ,customs ,and war power confiscation matters ,and preclude its
general use as analte rnative to or supplement to criminal prosecu 
tion . While that would have b
een a logical development ,and one
justified b
y the special circumstances in those fields o flaw that led
to the expedient o fcivil for e
f iture ,it has never come to pass . The
Court has never held that the use o fcivil o
fr e
fiture proceedings to
en o
f rce a penal law is unconstitutional . A
nd , o
f r the most part ,it
has declined to extend to any kind o fcivil o
fr e
fiture proceedings
the constitutional sa fe
guards in the Bill o f R
ights that apply to
criminal cases .
Fi tfeen years a tfer the decision in Miller,the Supreme Court ap 
peared ,for a brie ftime ,to be headed in the direction o fapplying all
o fthe various constitutional sa fe
guards to civil for e
fitures , even
those e ff
ected for revenue o ff
enses . In Coffey v. United States, 14
decided in 1886, the Court held that a judgment o facquittal in a
s b
arred
crimi n
al proceeding o
f r violating the intern
al revenue la w
n
fr e
fiture proceeding against
the United States from b
ringi g a civil o
property o fthe criminal de fe
ndant that was predicated on the same
underl yi
ng o ff
ense . By holding th <l;
t the acquittal was "
conclusive "
o fissues in the
'
subsequent proceeding ,the Court seemed to b
e em 
ploying a res judicataanalysis .75 But the Court also cited approv 
ingly to a lower court decision , United States v. McKee, 76which held
that a conviction o
f r conspiracy to de fraud the government o ftaxes
b
arred a su b
sequent civil action for payment o fa penalty equal to
dou b
le the amount o fthe taxes due .77 By endorsing the holding in
that case ,the Court in Coffeyappeared to b
e saying that o
f r fe
i ture
73. Miller, 78 U.S. at 323. As Levy notes, Justice Field's fears that in rem forfeiture would
increasingly be used as a substitute for in personam criminal proceedings have been borne
out by recent history. P. 57.
74. 116 U.S. 436 (1886).
75. Under the usual collateral estoppel analysis, however, the differing burdens of proof
in criminal and civil proceedings would have deprived the acquittal of any preclusive effect in
a subsequent civil proceeding.
76. 26 F. Cas. 1116 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1877) (No. 15,688). The decision in McKee was au
thored by Justice Miller, sitting as Circuit Justice.
77. In bis opinion in McKee, Justice Miller noted that where the offense and transaction
in the two proceedings are the same, "our laws forbid that be or any one else shall be pun
ished for the same crime or misdemeanor." 26 F. Cas. at 1117.
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proceedings in the circumstances of its case were "criminal" for
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause,78 which represented a
more logical, though potentially more sweeping, basis for its deci
sion. For if civil forfeiture in excise cases was "criminal" in this
sense, then it would seem that the full panoply of procedural pro
tections in criminal cases should apply to civil forfeiture cases.
One month later, the Court in Boyd v. United States79 took an
other step in that direction by holding that two constitutional pro
tections applicable to criminal proceedings - the F ourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable · searches and the
Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause - were applicable to
civil forfeiture proceedings. This decision, which was all the more
significant because it involved a customs forfeiture, rested primarily
on several considerations. First, the Court rejected the proposition
that an in rem forfeiture proceeding "is not, in effect, a proceeding
against the owner of the property."80 As the Court observed,
"[P]roceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture
of a man's property by reason of offenses committed by him,
though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal."81
Under the statute at issue in Boyd, the conduct that gave rise to a
forfeiture was also a crime; and, in addition, the sanction of forfei
ture was available in both a civil in rem proceeding and in a crimi
nal prosecution.82 The Court also believed that, in light of the
American Colonists' strong opposition to the writs of assistance is
sued to customs officers to enforce the English customs regulations,
the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches
and seizures was clearly intended to apply to such proceedings.83
As for the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
the Court believed that wrongfully obtaining an individual's per
sonal papers for the purpose of using them as evidence against him
78. In his opinion for the Court in Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630 (1926), Justice
Holmes acknowledged the Coffey decision, but held that it was inapplicable to a nuisance
abatement proceeding under the National Prohibition Act that was co=enced after an ac
quittal in a criminal proceeding brought under the same Act. The Court concluded that the
purpose of the decree, which closed the defendants' building for a year, is "prevention, not a
second punishment that could not be inflicted after acquittal from the first." See Murphy,
272 U.S. at 632. It added that "[t]his seems to us to be shown by the whole scope of the
section as well as by the unreasonableness of interpreting it as intended to accomplish a
plainly unconstitutional result." Murphy, 272 U.S. at 632.
79. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
80. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 637.
81. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634.
82. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
83. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625, 626-27. The writs of assistance gave customs officers the
equivalent of a general search warrant to search for (and seize) smuggled goods and other
evidence of customs violations. See supra note 22.
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is not "substantially different from compelling him to be a witness
against himself. "84
But if the Supreme Court in that era was inclined to extend all
of the various criminal protections to civil forfeiture cases because
of their quasi-criminal nature, it soon abandoned that plan. In
Origet v. United States, 85 decided just two years after Boyd and Cof
fey, the Court declined to read the same customs statute involved in
Boyd as requiring forfeitures to be imposed only after a criminal
conviction for the customs offense.86 As such, the Court appeared
to take for granted that statutory authorization of customs forfei
ture in a civil in rem proceeding posed no due process problems.
And eight years later, in United States v. Zucker,87 the Court unani
mously held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend
ment did not apply to a forfeiture arising out of a customs
violation.88
2.

The Modern Era

Modem forfeiture law continues to display the ambivalence of
earlier eras. The Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment hold
ings in Boyd were reaffirmed in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Penn
sylvania89 and United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 90
respectively, but the Coffey holding has been overruled.91 In 1993,
the Court unanimously held in Austin v. United States that civil in
rem forfeiture und�r two provisions of the federal drug forfeiture
statute is punitive, and hence that the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633.
125 U.S. 240 (1888).
See Origet, 125 U.S. at 245-46.
161 U.S. 475 (1896).
See Zucker, 161 U.S. at 476. The Court distinguished Boyd on the grounds that, while
the constitutional provisions at issue in Boyd applied to criminal "cases," the Sixth Amend
ment Confrontation Clause applied by its terms to "criminal prosecutions." See Zucker, 161
U.S. at 480-81. The Court indicated that civil forfeiture proceedings, though they can be
84.

85.
86.
87.
88.

considered criminal cases for purposes of the Constitution, could in no event be regarded as
"criminal prosecutions." See Zucker, 161 U.S. at 480-81.

89. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
90. 401 U.S. 715 (1971). The holding in Plymouth Sedan emphasized that the "object [of
a civil forfeiture proceeding], like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of
an offense against the law," 380 U.S. at 700; and the Court in United States Coin & Currency
reiterated the statement in Boyd that forfeiture proceedings, although "civil in form, are in
their nature criminal for Fifth Amendment purposes." 401 U.S. at 718 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

91. The holding in Coffey was essentially overruled in United States v. One Assortment of

89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984). And recently, in United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267

(1996), the Court held that successive civil forfeitures and criminal prosecutions for drug
offenses do not violate double jeopardy. The Court in Ursery simply ignored Coffey and the
decisions that followed it when it suggested that successive civil forfeitures and criminal pros
ecutions have been permitted since the formation of the Republic. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at
274.
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Eighth Amendment applies to such forfeitures.92 But three years
later, in an 8-1 decision that is hopelessly at odds with Austin, the
Court held, inter alia, that forfeiture under one of the very same
statutory provisions93 is not "punitive" for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.94 Thus, the contradictions in the Court's treat
ment of civil forfeiture, which began in the Nineteenth Century,
have only been exacerbated by the decision in Ursery. 95
While a strong case can be made for holding that, as a matter of
procedural due process, civil forfeiture proceedings must generally
be confined to their traditional uses in the maritime, customs, �nd
wartime confiscation fields, and that, as a general rule, forfeiture
proceedings outside those areas must be criminal in form, the
Supreme Court today shows no signs that it is prepared to resolve
the contradictions in its forfeiture decisions by adopting such a rule.
The Court has, however, at least recognized in a recent case that
procedures applicable to customs and excise tax violations do not
necessarily pass muster under the Due Process Clause when utilized
in other forfeiture contexts. Thus, in United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property, 96 the Court held that the seizure of real prop
erty before obtaining a judgment in a forfeiture proceeding - and
without affording the owner prior notice and an opportunity to be
92.

See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.

602, 622 {1993).

93. 21 U.S.C. § 881{a)(7) {1994) (providing for forfeiture of real property that "is used or
intended to be used . . . to facilitate the commission of' a drug offense).
94. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at 290. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court rests on
the curious proposition that a forfeiture may or may not be punitive in nature and effect,
depending on which provision of the Bill of Rights is at issue. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at 287.
95. The contradictions in the Court's recent forfeiture jurisprudence have also been man
ifested by conflicting interpretations it has given to prior case law. In Austin, the Court read
a series of forfeiture decisions as having been predicated on "the notion that the owner ha[d)
been negligent in allowing his property to be misused." Austin, 509 U.S. at 615. In Bennis v.
Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996), the Court read those very same cases as having permitted
forfeiture without regard to owner fault. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 447-50. (See infra notes
103-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of the holding in Bennis.) The Court's recent
forfeiture decisions also reveal starkly conflicting views regarding whether the atavistic
"guilty property" fiction has any role in modem constitutional adjudication. The fiction was
all but abandoned in Austin, but the Court once again invoked it in Bennis and in Ursery, in
rejecting the constitutional claims in those cases. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 447; Ursery, 518
U.S. at 275 (majority opinion); 518 U.S. at 315 (Stevens, J., concurring in part in the judg
ment and dissenting in part). As this review was going to press, the Supreme Court decided a
very important forfeiture case, United States v. Bajakjian, No. 96-1487, 1998 U.S. LEXIS
4172 (Supreme Court, June 22, 1998). In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Court
in Bajakajian held that a criminal forfeiture of cash under a currency reporting statute vio
lated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Bajakajian, 1998 U.S.
LEXIS 4172, at *42. Justice Thomas's opinion aptly distinguishes traditional in rem customs
forfeitures from both the criminal forfeiture at issue in Bajakajian, see Bajakajian, 1998 U.S.
LEXIS 4172 at *20-22, *35-36, and from certain other modem in rem forfeitures, see
Bajakajian, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4172 at *17 n.4, *21 n.6. But the Court's use of the "remedial"
and "punitive" dichotomy in drmving that distinction is not very reassuring in light of its
failure to apply those concepts consistently in its Ursery and Austin decisions.
96. 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
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heard - violated due process,97 even though (as the Court ac
knowledged) its precedents permitted the government to make
such seizures in, inter alia, revenue cases.98
The kind of incremental approach to fashioning constitutional
protections for civil forfeiture cases exhibited by James Daniel
Good Real Property is probably the best we can hope for from the
Supreme Court.99 Yet even this more modest approach can also
benefit from the recognition that in rem civil forfeiture has histori
cally been narrowly limited in its scope to revenue, maritime, and
war powers matters. Because of that traditional limitation, proce
dures that qualify as "due process" in those kinds of forfeiture pro
ceedings need not automatically be deemed constitutional in other
civil forfeiture settings. And due process precedents involving reve
nue, maritime, and war powers forfeitures should not be regarded
as controlling in cases involving modern, nontraditional uses of civil
forfeiture. Recognition of the traditional scope of civil forfeiture
then should, at the very least, afford the Court greater latitude to
devise new due process protections for the newer applications of
civil forfeiture.100 In the next section of this review, I will propose
the adoption of one particular due process protection in civil forfei
ture cases that is absolutely basic to our system of justice.

97. Similarly, Justice Kennedy's separate dissent in Bennis, 516 U.S. at 473, recognized
that the rationale of those admiralty forfeiture cases that made no provision for innocent
owners did not necessarily apply to forfeitures arising in other contexts. See 516 U.S. at 47273 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
98. See James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. at 60; see supra note 59. In his partial
dissent, Justice Thomas recognized that contemporary civil forfeiture under the drug forfei
ture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881, "differs . . . in kind . . . from its historical antecedents" and has
"all but detached [itself] from the ancient notion of civil forfeiture," James Daniel Good Real
Property, 510 U.S. at 82, 85 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But since
Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority's basis for distinguishing the revenue cases, he
may not have been making the point that modem civil forfeiture has been detached from its
moorings in revenue and admiralty cases.
99. Indeed, extending the holding in James Daniel Good Real Property to other types of
property - such as cash and automobiles - would prevent some of the most serious abuses
of civil forfeiture. See supra note 9.
100. That recognition might have led to a different result in Bennis, which rejected, inter
alia, a due process-based protection for innocent owners. See Bennis, 516 U.S. 453. With the
exception of Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926), all of the cases relied upon by the
Bennis majority, including J. W. Goldsmith-Jr. Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921),
were admiralty or revenue cases. Goldsmith-Jr. Grant Co. was decided during the Prohibi
tion era, but the forfeiture in that case actually predated national Prohibition and was ef
fected under provisions of the excise tax law, rather than the forfeiture provisions of the
Volstead Act. See supra note 50.
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II. A MORE MODEST PROPOSAL: RECOGNITION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR INNOCENT OWNERS DERIVED
FROM OUR LONG TRADITION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
RESTRICTIONS AGAINST ARBITRARY DEPRIVATIONS
OF PROPERTY

In this section of the review, I will propose an incremental con
stitutional change to forfeiture that Levy and others regard as fun
damental - namely, a protection for innocent owners. Levy argues
compellingly that "[t]he worst feature of forleiture . . . is its failure
to provide adequately for the rights of innocent people" (p. 161).
He suggests, without much elaboration, that the "old substantive
due process" doctrine (p. 87) would prevent government from
forfeiting a blameless person's property, and condemns the Court
for "abdicat[ing its] responsibility of judicial review in such cases
" 101
A due process-based protection for innocent owners should re
quire that the government prove owner culpability at least amount
ing to negligence102 in the forfeiture proceedings, or (at the very
least) it should afford the owner an affirmative defense based on
lack of such culpability. Using Levy's comments as a point of de
parture, I will attempt to show how such a protection can be de
rived from substantive due process principles that are deeply
imbedded in our nation's jurisprudence. I will first trace the devel
opment of the substantive component of due process doctrine from
its pre-Civil War origins in the Nineteenth Century, and show how
the protection against arbitrary takings of private property by gov
ernment was central to the doctrine. I will then suggest that the
values that animated the development of substantive due process
remain very much alive today, and that a straightforward applica
tion of the doctrine would yield an innocent owner protection in
civil forfeiture cases.
101. P. 88. An innocent owner or co-owner may be victimized if, after entrusting prop
erty to somebody else or othenvise permitting him or her to use it, that person, without the
owner's prior knowledge or consent, then proceeds to use it to facilitate the commission of an
offense. The same may happen when a person receives a gift of property without knowledge
that the prior owner has engaged in acts that (under the so-called relation-back doctrine)
make it forfeitable as of the time of the commission of those acts.
102. In cases where one owner's property was misused by another, negligence in entrust
ing property would, by analogy to the co=on law tort of negligent entrustment, require that
the owner know or should have known of an impending misuse before a forfeiture could be
effected. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965). Similarly, in the case of prop
erty forfeitable on the basis of acts of a former owner, the minimum level of culpability
would be actual or constructive knowledge of the acts of the former owner that rendered it
subject to forfeiture, including the former owner's use of money derived from unlawful activ
ities to purchase the property. See Grosfield v. United States, 276 U.S. 494, 499 (1927) (up
holding equitable decree ordering temporary closure of lessors' building, based on lessee's
perpetration of statutory nuisance, but implying that decree would have been reversed if
lessors had not "kn[own] of the tenant's violation of law" prior to bringing of suit).
·
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A recent and widely publicized Supreme Court decision, Bennis
Michigan, 103 crune to a different conclusion regarding the exist
ence of a constitutional protection for innocent owners. In Bennis,
the Court upheld, by a slim 5-to-4 majority, the forfeiture of a wife's
interest in a family automobile on the basis that her husband had
used it for a liaison with a prostitute. Mrs. Bennis had argued that,
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause (as incorporated against the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment), the forfeiture of her prop
erty interest104 was unconstitutional because she neither knew nor
should have known that her husband would use the automobile in
that fashion.105 She argued that her interest in the car could not be
touched by the state and, therefore, that she was entitled to com
pensation for it.106 The Court rejected her Due Process and Tak
ings claims, citing what it characterized as a "longstanding practice"
permitting such forfeitures. 101
v.

This section of my review \vill not directly critique the Bennis
decision, and will not simply replicate arguments made in the briefs
in that case or in Justice Stevens's powerful dissent. Instead, it will
focus more broadly on the deep roots of substantive due process
doctrine in our jurisprudence and the component of that doctrine
that protects against arbitrary deprivations of private property.
Contrary to the Court's intimations in Bennis, I will conclude that
103. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
104. Her interest in the automobile was likened to that of a co-tenant in a tenancy in
common. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 6, Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996)
(94-8729). If this had been a private proceeding to enforce a judgment against Mrs. Bennis's
husband, it is clear that her interest would have been protected. For it is hombook law that a
judgment creditor with a judgment against one co-tenant of joint property is only entitled to
satisfy the judgment out of the judgment debtor's interest in the property. See, e.g., 30 AM.
JuR. 2o Executions and Enforcement ofJudgments §§ 171-172 (1994).

105. In addition to urging the Court to adopt a standard of culpability based on whether
the owner knew or should have known that somebody to whom she entrusted property
would use it illegally, see Brief for Petitioner at 25, Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996)
(No. 94-8729), Mrs. Bennis also argued that, while she would prevail even if she had the
burden of proof as to this issue, both the Due Process and Takings Clauses required that the
burden of proof with respect to that standard of culpability properly rested with the State.
See Brief for Petitioner at 37-45, Bennis v. Michigan (No. 94-8729). While the issue of who
should bear the burden of proof with respect to the guilt or innocence of the owner is critical,
it is beyond the scope of this review.
106. The order granting forfeiture in Bennis directs the proceeds to be used to pay "the
filing fee of this action," "attorney costs," and "all police costs," with "any remaining balance
. . . [to] be paid to the general treasury of the State of Michigan." Joint Appendix at 28,
Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) (No. 94-8729). Mrs. Bennis argued that, whether for
the purpose of paying the law enforcement costs of the forfeiture proceeding or adding to the
State treasury, forfeiture of her interest, without payment of compensation to her by the
State, was unconstitutional. See Brief for Petitioner at 31-32, Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S.
442 (No. 94-8729); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, 15, Bennis v. Michigan, 516
U.S. 442 (No. 94-8729).
107. 516 U.S. at 453. But see supra note 100.
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there are "longstanding" principles of due process that would have
precluded the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property.ms
A.

A Constitutional Protection for Innocent Owners Resists Easy
Classification Under Either the "Procedural" or
"Substantive" Strands of Due Process Doctrine

Before embarking on my discussion of the history of "substan
tive" due process, it is worth digressing for a moment about the
"procedural" and "substantive" dichotomy in due process analysis,
because a claimed protection for innocent owners in forfeiture
cases resists such easy classification. Modern constitutional analysis
generally distinguishes between "substantive" or "procedural" due
process in claims brought under either the Fifth Amendment or
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses. "Procedural" due
process is said to impose "constitutional limits on judicial, execu
tive, and administrative enforcement of legislative or other govern
mental dictates or decisions," while "substantive due process"
imposes limits "on the content of legislative action."109 While it is
certainly useful conceptually, this dichotomy, like the "substance"
108. Space limitations preclude any extensive consideration of the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment as a potential constitutional source for a rule that protects blameless own
ers from forfeiture. The purpose of the Takings Clause is "to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole," Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). In Calero
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974), the Court, citing, inter alia,
to the Armstrong principle, declared that it "would be difficult to reject the constitutional
claim of . . . an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the
wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent
the proscribed use of his property." In Bennis, 516 U.S. at 449-50, the Court repudiated the
Calero-Toledo dictum without explaining why it no longer believed, as it did in 1974, that the
Armstrong principle would bar a forfeiture of the property of an innocent person. The Ben
nis Court quickly disposed of Tma Bennis's takings claim by stating in so many words that, if
the forfeiture passes muster under the Due Process Clause, it must necessarily pass muster
under the Takings Clause. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 452-53. But the Court's premise that the
Takings Clause is coextensive in scope with the Due Process Clause relies on a string cite to
two utterly inapposite cases; and, moreover, runs completely counter to the Court's recent
regulatory takings jurisprudence, which has emphasized the status of the Takings Clause as
an independent restraint on state power in the Constitution. See Nollan v. California Coastal
Commn., 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.3 (1987); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1029 n.14 (1992). Also relevant to a takings analysis is the Court's holding in Lucas
that the use of "confiscatory regulations" that exceed either co=on law limits on the power
of the state to abate public nuisances, or the power to destroy real and personal property in
cases of actual necessity involving grave threats to the lives and property of others, see supra
note 45, will give rise to a compensable taking. If a forfeiture under a nuisance-abatement
statute of the kind involved in Bennis does not fall within those two traditional powers, then
there is a powerful argument that the forfeiture should be treated as a compensable taking
under Lucas, at least with respect to an innocent owner or co-owner. See supra note 44; see
also Grosfield v. United States, 276 U.S. 494, 499 (1927) (implying that statutory nuisance
abatement action requires proof of owner's knowledge of nuisance committed by another,
despite absence of such a requirement in the statute).
109. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7, at 664 & n.4 (2d ed.
1988).
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and "procedure" dichotomy used in other areas of the law,110 has its
limitations. Given the multifarious nature of legal rules and other
governmental action that may effect a deprivation of "life, liberty,
or property," whether a particular due process claim falls into one
category or the other is not always clear,1 11 and may even be a func
tion of how the issue is framed.1 12
A claimed protection for innocent owners in forfeiture cases
that is grounded in the Due Process · Clause avoids easy classifica
tion, especially if one believes, on procedural due process grounds,
that civil forfeiture outside the maritime, customs, and war power
fields is illegitimate, and that any such forfeitures should be admin
istered in criminal proceedings only.113 For if criminal proceedings
were used to effect a forfeiture, the government would almost al
ways be charging a property owner with some criminal offense as
the basis for the forfeiture, in which case the issue of whether an
innocent owner's property may be forfeited would not arise.114 But
if the issue is framed simply as whether a particular forfeiture stat110. For example, the conceptual difficulties experienced by courts in applying the proce
duraUsubstantive distinction of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S.64 (1938), are well
known.
111. An example of a due process issue that defies easy classification is whether the state
may shift the burden of proof regarding a traditional element of a crime. See, e.g., Mullaney
v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 685-86, 704-05 (1975) (holding that state had to bear the burden of
proof as to element of malice in homicide prosecution).
112. Substance and procedure are interrelated anyway, inasmuch as the purpose of a par
ticular procedural protection accorded to a party in an adjudicatory proceeding is usually to
advance a substantive goal. Very often, that purpose is to eliminate, as much as possible, the
risk of erroneous findings of culpability or liability in a judicial or administrative proceeding.
See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78 (1986) (alluding to the "host of [procedural] safe
guards" that "diminish the risk of erroneous conviction"). Thus, the very existence of a par
ticular procedural pro�ection that has been held applicable to a particular set of cases - say,
the due process requirement that the state prove guilt in a criminal case beyond a reasonable
doubt - may imply the existence of certain substantive due process rights, such as the right
of a person the government knows or believes to be innocent not to be subjected to
punishment.
113. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
114.To be sure, one can imagine a criminal forfeiture statute that targets owners who
entrust their property to other persons, who in turn use the property to facilitate an offense.
But one would expect such a statute to assume the form of a typical accessory liability stat
ute, which would require as an element of the offense some complicity in the offense giving
rise to the forfeiture. Otherwise, the statute would be imposing a kind of vicarious criminal
liability, which was unknown at common law here, and today is almost unheard of in our
statutory criminal law, except with respect to the special case of corporations, which can be
held liable for the acts of their agents. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusnN W.
Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 251-52, 254-58 (2d ed. 1986). In his classic article on vicarious
criminal liability, Professor Sayre observed that "[v]icarious liability is a conception repug
nant to every instinct of the criminal jurist." Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the
Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REv. 689, 702 (1930). Of course, the civil forfeiture of an
innocent owner's property on the basis of acts of another person itself imposes a kind of
vicarious punitive liability on the owner. And since the owner in a civil proceeding has far
fewer procedural protections than he would in a criminal proceeding, the imposition of vica
rious punitive liability in the context of a civil forfeiture is to that extent even more objec
tionable than its use in a criminal proceeding would be.
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ute must include owner culpability as one of the elements giving
rise to a forfeiture, the claim would appear to be substantive in na
ture. On the other hand, if the issue is framed as whether the
owner should be afforded a procedure for asserting an innocent
owner defense in a forfeiture proceeding (or whether the govern
ment should have to prove fault), the claim begins to sound more
like a procedural due process claim. Other variations in formulat
ing the issue lead to further enigmas of classification. For example,
in a case like Bennis involving jointly owned property, the issue
could be framed narrowly as whether the forfeiture, without com
pensation, of an innocent co-owner's interest in property, on the
basis of a co-owner's misuse of it, violated due process. Under that
formulation, the proper classification of the due process claim
would depend on whether the requirement to pay compensation for
certain property deprivations is best regarded as a procedural or
substantive limitation on governmental power.
B. The Doctrine of Substantive Due Process - Including the
Principle that Government May Not Engage in Arbitrary Takings
of Property
Has Deep Roots in Our Jurisprudence
-

Regardless of how a constitutional protection of this kind
should be characterized, the notion that due process should protect
private property from arbitrary confiscation by government has
deep roots in our constitutional and social history that continue to
this day.115 Statements evincing the need to protect private prop
erty from arbitrary takings began appearing in Supreme Court
opinions very soon after the Court was formed. In its 1798 decision
in Calder v. Bull, 116 the Supreme Court held that a special act of the
Connecticut legislature that retroactively granted a new trial in a
probate case did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Consti
tution. While upholding the law, Justice Samuel Chase's opinion
for the Court included this famous quotation regarding the limits of
the authority of state legislatures:
An Act of the Legislature {for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the
great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a
115. For much of the discussion of Nineteenth-Century case law that follows, I have re
lied heavily on Professor Edward Corwin's superb but somewhat forgotten 1948 book,
Liberty Against Government. That book traces the history of substantive due process from its
Roman and English origins to its early development in the period preceding and following
the Civil War, where it operated as a bar to arbitrary deprivation of private property, and
then to its significant expansion in the so-called Lochner era of Supreme Court jurispru
dence, from 1905 to 1937, where it operated primarily as a restraint on regulation that was
said to impair the liberty of contract of employers. The Lochner-era jurisprudence, with its
expansive notions of the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause, has, of course, long
been discredited. But the idea that due process protects against arbitrary deprivations of
"property" is, as I will show in this review, an enduring one in our constitutional tradition.
116. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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rightful exercise of legislative authority. . . A law that punished a
citizen for an innocent action . . . a law that destroys, or impairs, the
lawful private contracts of citizens; a law that makes a man a Judge in
his own cause; or a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B:
It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a legislature
with sucH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they
have done it. . . . [T]he general principles of law and reason forbid
them. The Legislature . . . cannot change innocence into guilt; or pun
ish innocence as a crime; or violate the right . . ofprivate property. 111
.

.

The principle that the state could not "take[ ] property from A.
and give[ ] it to B" or "punish[ ] . . . an innocent action" became,
with some additional elaborations, important to the meaning given
to the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and analogous provi
sions in state constitutions in the period preceding the Civil War,
and thereafter to the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Under an interpretation of the Due Process Clause that came to be
embraced in varying degrees by members of the bar, judges, and
the general public, the "due" - or "just" - process required to
deprive a person of property had to be judicial in nature. More
over, in order to qualify as "due" process, the judicial proceeding
had to be one that both observed traditional judicial procedures
and applied accepted general principles of the criminal and civil law
for divesting a person of his property. A caveat to this requirement
was that states could seize private property for a public purpose,
but they had to pay just compensation to the affected property
owner.118
Several state court decisions applying the "law of the land"
clauses in their state constitutions, which were a counterpart to the
federal Due Process Clause, helped foster this interpretation of due
process in the early Nineteenth Century.119 In 1804, in University
ofNorth Carolina v. Foy, 120 the North Carolina Supreme Court de
clared legislation that repealed an earlier grant of lands to the Uni
versity void under the "law of the land" clause of the state
117. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388.
118. See generally CORWIN, supra note 115, at 80 (discussing Chancellor Kent's famous
and influential Commentaries on American Law).
119. The "law of the land" clauses in the early state constitutions were usually taken
almost verbatim from chapter 29 of the Magna Carta of 1225, which provided that "[n]o free
man shall be taken or imprisoned or deprived of his freehold or of his liberties or free cus
toms, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, nor shall we go upon him, nor shall
we send upon him, except by a legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." See
CORWIN, supra note 115, at 23-24, 90-91; A.E. DICK HoWARD, THE ROAD FROM
RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONAUSM IN AMERICA (1968). The phrase
"due process of law" is drawn from 28 Edw. III, ch. 3 (1355) (Eng.). See CORWIN, supra note
115, at 91. The famous English jurist, Sir Edward Coke, maintained that the two phrases
were synonymous, and they have generally been understood that way in our jurisprudence.
See id. at 91.
120. 5 N.C. (1 Murph.) 58 (1805).
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constitution. The court stated that such a property deprivation
could not occur "until the judiciary of the country in the usual and
common form pronounce [the trustees of the University] guilty of
such acts as will in law amount to a forfeiture of their rights."121
In an 1843 New York case, Taylor v. Porter,122 the court, follow
ing Hoke v. Henderson, 123 held that the "law of the land" clause in
the New York Constitution meant that "before a man can be de
prived of his property, 'it must be ascertained judicially that he has
forfeited his privileges, or that someone else has a superior title to
the property he possesses."'124
The U.S. Supreme Court offered a consistent, if somewhat more
abstract, construction of a state law of the land clause in an 1819
case in which the Court was asked, inter alia, to determine whether
the Maryland Constitution125 was violated by a statute which pro
vided banks with a summary remedy for the collection of notes pay
able to them.126 The Court rejected the claim because, in its view,
the maker of the note had contractually relinquished his rights to
the "ordinary administration of justice."121 But the Court went out
of its way to explain the meaning of the law of the land clause in a
way that suggested it contained a substantive limitation on state
power:
As to the words from Magna Charta, incorporated into the constitu
tion of Maryland, after volumes spoken and written with a view to
their exposition, the good sense of mankind has at length settled
down to this: that they were intended to secure the individual from
the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by
the established principles of private rights and distributive justice.128
121. 5 N.C. (1 Murph.) at 89. The doctrine embraced in Foy was reaffirmed in an 1833
North Carolina case, Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 {1833). See CORWIN, supra note
115, at 94. In Hoke, the court held that
in reference to the infliction of punishment and divesting of the rights of property, it has
been repeatedly held in this State, and it is believed, in every other of the Union, that
there are limitations upon the legislative power . . . and that the [law of the land] clause
itself means that such legislative acts, as profess in themselves directly to punish persons
or to deprive the citizen of his property, without trial before the judicial tribunals, and a
decision upon the matter of rights, as determined by the laws under which it vested,
according to the course, mode and usages of the co=on law as derived from our fore
fathers, are not effectually 'laws of the land' for those purposes.
Hoke, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) at 15-16.
122. 4 Hill (N.Y.) 1401 {1843).
123. 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833).
124. CORWIN, supra note 115, at 98 (citation omitted).
125. The "law of the land" provision in the Maryland Constitution provided that "[n]o
freeman ought to be taken or imprisoned, etc., or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but
by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land." Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 235, 241 {1819).
126. See Okely, 17 U.S. at 235.
127. 17 U.S. at 243.
128. 17 U.S. at 244. The quotation in Okely equates an "arbitrary exercise" of the gov
ernment's powers with an action that contravenes "established principles" of "distributive
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The 1856 New York case of Wynehamer v. State of New York129
occupies an extremely prominent place in the development of due
process restrictions against the arbitrary taking of property by the
government. In that case, the State of New York enacted a prohibi
tion statute which
forbade all owners of intoxicating liquors to sell them under any con
ditions save for medicinal purposes, forbade them further to store
such liquors when not designed for sale in any place but a dwelling
house, made the violation of these prohibitions a misdemeanor, and
denounced the offending liquors as nuisances and ordained their de
struction by summary process.130

In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held, inter alia, that, in its application
to liquor owned and possessed prior to the enactment of the law,
the New York intemperance law deprived persons of property with
out due process of law.131
The various opinions in Wynehamer made clear that a judicial
process that followed the customary procedures was not necessarily
enough to constitute "due process." For if the deprivation of prop
erty was based on "no offense, except the misfortune of being [an]
owner,"132 the use of "a process and tribunal"133 would not avoid a
violation of due process.134
The Wynehamer decision was regarded as "epoch-making"13S
very soon after it was announced, and received what Professor
Corwin described as a "resounding"136 endorsement a year later in
Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford. 131 In dejustice." Distributive justice is a philosophic concept of Aristotelian origin which refers to
the rules by which "a society . . . should allocate its scare resources or products among [the]
individuals . . ." who comprise it. See JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
1 (1996). A number of theories of distributive justice have been propounded in recent years,
including Rawlsian theory and neo-Lockean theories of the kind advanced by Robert Nozick
in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. See ROEMER, supra, at 172-82; 205-07. By "established princi
ples" of distributive justice, the Court in Okely presumably meant the prevailing common
law rules regarding the acquisition and transfer of property by private persons, and its divest
iture through the operation of recognized tort and criminal law rules. As such, an "arbitrary
exercise of [governmental] power" would have been any action of government that contra
vened those prevailing rules.
129. 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
130. CORWIN, supra note 115, at 101.
131. See CORWIN, supra note 115, at 102 (describing holding of Wynehamer) ; Morr,
supra note 41, at 317 (same).
132. Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 404.
133. Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 393.
134. See Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 420 ("To provide for a trial to ascertain whether a man is
in the enjoyment of [life, liberty, or property], and then, as a consequence of finding that he is
in the enjoyment of it, to deprive him of it, is doing indirectly just what is forbidden to be
done directly, and reduces the [Due Process Clause] to a nullity") (Johnson, J., concurring).
135. Morr, supra note 41, at 318.
136. CORWIN, supra note 115, at 110.
137. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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elating the Missouri Compromise void, Justic� Taney relied, inter
alia, on the assertion that the law violated the dut'. process rights of
slaveowners. As he wrote,
[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of
his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his
property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had
committed no offense against the laws, could hardly be dignified with
the name of due process of law.138

Despite some recent suggestions to the contrary by Justice
Scalia,139 the Dred Scott case was not the first time the Supreme
Court (or one or more of its justices) had invoked substantive due
process. In Bloomer v. McQuewan, 140 the Court interpreted an
1845 act of Congress which extended the life of patents by seven
years, from 1849 to 1856, so as to avoid a construction which would
have entailed a violation of substantive due process. The issue was
whether the Act of 1845 protected the licensee under a patent for a
machine (by extending the license during the period of extension),
or was solely for the benefit of the owner of the patent. In inter
preting the Act of 1845 so as to protect the licensees, the Court said
that any contrary construction, by depriving them of their right to
use the patented machines, "certainly could not be regarded as due
process of law."141
The Court's landmark 1870 decision in Hepburn v. Griswold,142
which held the Civil War "Greenback" legislation unconstitutional,
also made use of substantive due process. Under that legislation,
Congress authorized for the first time the issuance of paper cur
rency not backed by specie, and declared it to be legal tender for all
debts public and private. Those notes depreciated in value after
their issuance and thus were worth less in gold coin than their face
value.143 In Hepburn, the petitioner, Mrs. Hepburn, made a prom
issory note to Griswold prior to passage of the Legal Tender Act,
and tendered the amount owed in paper notes (rather than gold
coin) in satisfaction of the debt to Griswold, who refused the
tender. On a 4-to-3 vote, the Supreme Court held the Legal Tender
138. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 450. In his strong dissent, Justice Curtis took issue with Chief
Justice Taney's reliance on the Due Process Clause, but significantly did not reject the propo
sition that the Clause contains a substantive protection against arbitrary takings of property.
See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 624-27.
139. See ANroNIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND TiiE
LAW 143 n.23 ( As far as I am aware, Dred Scott was the first and only pre-Fourteenth
"

Amendment decision of the Supreme Court to employ substantive due process . . . .").

140. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852).
141. 55 U.S. at 553; see also Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 235 (1819),
discussed supra, notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
142. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
143. By July 1864, only two years after their issuance, a dollar in paper currency was
worth only thirty-five cents in gold coin. See Hepburn, 75 U.S. at 608.
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Act unconstitutional, insofar as it mandated acceptance of the pa
per currency as legal tender for all pre-existing debts, in part be
cause it violated the Fifth Amendment proscription against
depriving a person of property "without due process of law." 144
According to Professor Corwin, by the time Hepburn was de
cided in January 1870, "the crucial ruling in Wynehamer v. The Peo
ple was far on the way to being assimilated into the accepted
constitutional law of the country." 145 Not only judges, but also law
yers, scholars, legislators, and even some members of the general
public146 were using due process in the substantive sense. Thus, the
brief of the respondent in the Hepburn case, which was filed on
January 2, 1867, argued that:
The [Greenback] act does not consist with either the spirit or letter of
the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of
property except by due process of law . . . . To compel us to take
payment in treasury notes, worth at present only about two thirds of
their nominal value, is to deprive us in this instance of nearly half of
our property; and, not being done by process of law, is clearly in viola
tion of the Constitution.147

And in 1866, Congressman John Bingham, the Ohio legislator
who is credited by all commentators with drafting Sections One and
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,148 when asked whether his
draft of the Amendment was directed solely to the protection of
American citizens of African descent, responded:
I should say that it is proposed as well to protect the thousands and
tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of loyal white citizens of
144. Hepburn, 75 U.S. at 624-25. The Court likened the Act to a hypothetical act that
would "compel[ ] all citizens to accept, in satisfaction of all contracts for money, half or
three-quarters or any other proportion less than the whole of the value actually due, accord
ing to their terms." 75 U.S. at 625. The Court added, "It is difficult to conceive what act
would take private property without process of law if such an act would not." 75 U.S. at 625.
The composition of the Court changed shortly after the Hepburn decision, and it was over
ruled approximately a year later, in Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870), in an opinion
that essentially sidestepped the due process issue.
145. CORWIN, supra note 115, at 114. Indeed, some three years later, in Bartemeyer v.
Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1873), the first Supreme Court case that dealt primarily with the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court cited approvingly to
Wynehamer, and stated that a "grave" due process question would be presented by a prohibi
tion statute that prevented the sale of pre-existing stocks of liquor, see 85 U.S. at 133
which meant, of course, that any statute that authorized the destruction of such stocks would
also be suspect. See supra note 41.
146. For the view that much of the substantive development of due process was inspired
by extra-judicial sources, see HowARD JAY GRAHAM, Procedure to Substance: Extrajudicial
Rise of Due Process, 1830-1860, in EVERYMAN's CONSTITUTION 242, 243-62 (1968).
147. Brief for Defendant in Error at 24, Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603
(1870) (No. 241).
-

148. See Paul R. Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimina
tion Under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist Grounds, 80
MICH. L. REv. 462, 481 (1982).
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the United States whose property, by State legislation, has been
wrested from them under confiscation . . . 149
.

Congressman Bingham was referring to the state-level versions
of the Sequestration Act passed by the Confederate Congress in
August 1861 and used to confiscate property of alien enemies resid
ing in the Confederate States.150 He, too, was clearly using due pro
cess in its substantive sense - as a principle to protect property
from arbitrary deprivation.151 Finally, in 1868, Thomas M. Cooley
published his Constitutional Limitations, which Professor Corwin
described as "the most influential treatise ever published on Ameri
can constitutional law."152 Chapter XI of that treatise, which was
entitled "of The Protection to Property by 'The Law of the Land,"'
contained a systematic treatment of "the outstanding results of con
stitutional interpretation [of law of the land or due process clauses]
in State cases prior to the Civil War."153

149. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1065 (1866) (quoted in HowARD JAY GRAHAM,
The "Conspiracy Theory" ofthe Fourteenth Amendment: Part I, in EVERYMAN's CONSTITU
TION 48 (1968)). In an 1857 speech, Congressman Bingham suggested that extending slavery
to the new territories would be unconstitutional because the protections for "property" in the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause "contemplate[d] that no man shall be wrongfully de
prived of the fruit of his toil." See CoNG. GLOBE, 34th Cong. 3d Sess., app. at 140 (1857).
150. See GRAHAM, supra note 149, at 52. The Sequestration Act passed by the Confeder
ate Congress is reprinted in pertinent part in EDWARD McPHERSON, THE PoLmCAL His
TORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN DURING THE GREAT REBELLION 203-4 (2d ed.
1865). The Act called for the seizure of "all property belonging to alien enemies still residing
in the Confederate States as of May 21, 1861." 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE CONFEDERACY 388
(R.N. Current ed., 1993). The state-level versions of the Sequestration Act were used to
"seize everything from tobacco and cotton to pianos, city property, and ship cargo," id. at
389; and Vrrginia's act reportedly led to the confiscation of $500,000 from Union "enemies"
residing in the city of Richmond, id.
151. See also GRAHAM, supra note 149, at 53 (citing three major speeches of Congress
man Bingham in the 1850s that revealed his view of due process as "a limitation upon the
substance of legislation"). Abolitionists had also been using due process in the substantive
sense at least as early as 1837, usually in connection with the protections for "liberty" in the
Clause. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTisLAVERY CoNSTITUTIONAL
ISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, 266 (1977). The Republican Party Platforms of 1856 and 1860
each invoked the protection from deprivations of "liberty" in the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause as a basis for asserting that Congress had no power to "give legal existence to
slavery in any territory of the United States." See CoRWIN, supra note 115, at 114 (quoting
from platform); see also 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 27, 32 (Donald B. Johnson, ed.,
1978). Antislavery and proslavery advocates alike agreed that the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause afforded persons substantive protections of life, liberty, and property, but
disagreed as to whether slaves were "persons" or "property" within the meaning of the
Clause. See JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 122 (new enlarged ed., Collier Books
1965) (originally published as THE ANTisLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND
MENT (Univ. of Calif. Press, 1951)).
152. CORWIN, supra note 115, at 116.
153. Id. at 116-17. See generally THOMAS M. CooLEY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
(1868 ed.).
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Substantive Due Process Principles Require the Adoption of
an Innocent Owner Protection in Civil Forfeiture Cases

For those who subscribe to a theory of constitutional interpreta
tion based on original meaning or original intent, the view that the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause had a widely accepted
substantive meaning when it was ratified in 1868 must be taken seri
ously.154 But even for those who are not strict "originalists," the
principle that due process protects citizens from arbitrary takings of
property continued to be recognized thereafter,155 and it remains a
154. Justice Scalia, who is a self-professed "originalist" in constitutional interpretation,

see SCALIA, supra note 139, at 38, has been strongly critical of the doctrine of substantive due
process. See, e.g., id. at 143 n.23. But in light of the conclusions of Professor Corwin and

other evidence relating to how the concept of due process was actually being used near the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, his certainty that the original meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause did not include a substantive component
seems completely unwarranted. See id. ("(Of course I do not believe] that 'due process'
meant 'due substance' when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted."). In addition, Justice
Scalia's suggestion that any understanding of due process which included a substantive com
ponent would necessarily have been an "oxymoron," see United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S.
26, 39 {1994) {Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), presupposes that the reference to "pro
cess" in the Clause is (or was) entirely synonymous with "procedure." But the two words are
not synonymous, at least in contemporary usage, and it seems an entirely reasonable use of
language to say of a due or "just" judicial "process" that it must satisfy substantive as well as
procedural criteria. Indeed, a respected commentator once observed:
More than any other single clause of the Constitution, (the Due Process Clause] seems
on its face to guarantee, so far as any such provision can, both universal and personal
justice. No doubt the principal reasons are that one synonym of 'due process' is 'just'
process, and one popular connotation of 'law' is 'right and equity.' The . . . substantive
element thus is inherent in the terms.
GRAHAM, supra note 146, at 249. Justice Thomas appears to have been using the term "pro
cess" in the Due Process Clause to refer to a substantive rather than a procedural legal rule
when he suggested in Bennis that the "forfeiture of property without proof of the owner's
wrongdoing" satisfies the requirements of due process because it represents "a process of law
that can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country." Bennis v.
Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 454-55 {1996) {Thomas, J., concurring).
155. In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Cb,icago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), the
Supreme Court engaged in an extensive historical discussion of the development of due pro
cess as a restraint on arbitrary takings of property. It stated that,
if, as this Court has adjudged, a legislative enactment, assuming arbitrarily to take the
property of one individual and give it to another individual, would not be due process of
law as enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be that the requirement of due
process of law in that amendment is applicable to the direct appropriation by the State
to public use and without compensation of the private property of the citizen.
166 U.S. at 236. In an echo of statements in the Wynehamer decision, the Court made clear
that effecting such a deprivation through a judicial process would not satisfy due process,
absent payment of compensation:
Notice to the owner to appear in some judicial tribunal and show cause why his property
shall not be taken for public use without compensation would be a mockery of justice.
Due Process of law as applied to judicial proceedings instituted for the taking of private
property for public use means, therefore, such process as recognizes the right of the
owner to be compensated if his property be wrested from him and transferred to the
public.
166 U.S. at 236. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. is still cited approvingly by the Court, but today the
decision is sometimes treated not as if it had reaffirmed the substantive component of the
Due Process Clause discussed in this review, but rather as if it had incorporated the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause as against the states. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
383-84 & n.5 {1994).
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vitally important, if somewhat neglected, part of our constitutional
tradition. Moreover, judging from the amount and kind of public
criticism that greeted the Bennis decision,156 the fundamental
American values that underlie this aspect of our constitutional tra
dition remain very much alive today.
The implications of the doctrine of substantive due process for
recognition of an innocent-owner protection in civil forfeiture cases
are straightforward. When the government forfeits the property of
a person on the basis of its misuse by another person - and the
owner neither knew nor should have known of the misuse - the
government has engaged in an arbitrary taking of private property.
As the above discussion has shown, the prohibition against arbi
trary, uncompensated deprivations of private property has been the
central tenet of substantive due process doctrine throughout its his
torical development. As such, it should be easy for the Court to
conclude that due process requires a constitutional protection for
innocent owners in civil forfeiture cases.
156. The Bennis decision was subjected to nearly universal criticism in the op-ed pages of
newspapers across the country. A search through the computer service, NEXIS, whose
database contains a representative sampling of the nation's newspapers, revealed thirty-three
op-ed pieces and editorials that criticized the decision, and only two that supported it An
English newspaper summed up reaction here by reporting that the Court's ruling "has out
raged much of the [United States]," Henry Miller, Punished For Husband's Romp, EVENING
STANDARD (London), Mar. 6, 1996, at 4A. Besides the near-unanimity of opposition to the
decision, much of it was expressed in the kind of scathing terms not often seen in connection
with a decision of the nation's highest court. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Benchmarks ofAbsurdity;
A Criminal Step Too Far?, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1996, at A16 (criticizing decision on the
grounds, inter alia, that "forfeiting the property of owners whose conduct was faultless . . .
betrays a vindictiveness unworthy of any civilized system of law"); Forfeiting All Reason, S.F.
EXAMINER, Mar. 6, 1996, at A16 (describing decision as "dead wrong" and observing that
this is the kind of decision that makes "ordinary citizens wonder if members of the court . . .
live and breathe in cloud cuckoo land"); Forfeiting Fairness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at A30
(observing that the Supreme Court's "dubious achievement" in Bennis was to have issued a
ruling that "invites cynicism about the institution [of the Supreme Court] and the justice
system generally"); Improper Reasoning, ORANGE CoUNTY REG., Mar. 6, 1996, at B6 (de
nouncing the decision with the observation that "it's . . . worth remembering Christian writer
C.S. Lewis's admonition that a prostitute, whatever her faults, might be far closer to Heaven
than the self-righteous old prig who goes regularly to church-or, to extend the analogy, who
sits atop a Supreme Court bench"); Innocent and Punished, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 7,
1996, at 18A (calling decision "stunning in its disregard for constitutional principle"); Charles
Levendosky, High Court Takes Low Road on Forfeiture, DAYTON DAILY NEws, Mar. 14,
1996 at A15 (calling it "one of the most abysmal decisions to come from this court in years");
A Mindless Reading of the Law, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1996, at 24 (saying that the Court had
given "its constitutional approval to a seizure that was the height of injustice"); Nation's
Founders Would Gasp At Court's Stance, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 1996, at lOA (characterizing
decision as "appallingly unfair"); Punishing the Innocent, DES MOINES REG., Mar. 8, 1996, at
14A (suggesting that the majority ought to feel "shame in finding nothing in the Constitution
to protect citizens from losing property to the government when they have committed no
wrong"); Seizure Absurdity, SUNDAY GAZETTE MAIL (Charleston, W. Va.), Mar. 10, 1996, at
6B (saying, in reference to the decision, "[s]orry, but that doesn't sound like America to us");
Stuart Taylor, Jr., A Car Is Not a Pirate Ship, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 11, 1996, at 21; George F.
Will, Mrs. Bennis's Car, WASH. PosT, Mar. 10, 1996, at C7 (implying that Bennis belonged in
the same category as Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Lochner v. New York).
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CONCLUSION

Levy's book demonstrates that, with certain narrow exceptions,
civil forfeiture is an aberration in our law whose expansion in the
past two decades is threatening to "work a complete revolution in
our criminal jurisprudence. "157 The Supreme Court's response to
this threat, Levy further suggests, has not been adequate. But the
history of civil forfeiture offers the Court an opportunity to resolve
the many contradictions in its forfeiture jurisprudence and to fash
ion significant constitutional limitations to the use of civil forfeiture.
On due process grounds, the Court could (and in my view should)
hold that, outside its traditional domain in maritime, revenue, and
war power cases, civil forfeiture would simply be prohibited. Under
such a rule, criminal forfeiture would be the only constitutional op
tion for governments wishing to use the forfeiture sanction to ad
minister the criminal law. Alternatively, recognition of the narrow
historical scope of civil forfeiture would at least give the Court
greater latitude to fashion particular due process protections for the
growing number of expansive applications of civil forfeiture. One
such protection that Levy and many others regard as fundamental
would prevent blameless owners from having their property for
feited. Levy's suggestion that the "old substantive due process"
doctrine should be used to develop such a protection is a sound
one. A review of the history of substantive due process reveals that
it is a deeply imbedded part of our constitutional tradition, and that
its core tenet is the prohibition against arbitrary takings of prop
erty. A protection for innocent owners in forfeiture cases would
follow from a straightforward application of this tenet of substan
tive due process.

157. Miller

v.

United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 304, 323 (1871) (Field, J., dissenting).

